Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers by Hacker, Philipp & Petkova, Bilyana
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
Volume 15 Issue 1 Article 1 
Spring 5-2-2017 
Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, 
and New Regulatory Frontiers 
Philipp Hacker 
European University Institute 
Bilyana Petkova 
NYU Information Law Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip 
Recommended Citation 
Philipp Hacker and Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and 
New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2017). 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol15/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by 
an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
© 2017 by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N 
J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y 
A N D 






Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, 
Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers 
 

















Copyright 2017 by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law  Volume 15, Number 1 (2017) 






Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: 
Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory  
Frontiers 
 















* Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute; LL.M. (Yale). 
† Postdoctoral Research Fellow, NYU Information Law Institute, and Visiting Fellow, Yale Law 
School Information Society Project; M.S.L (Yale). 
This paper has benefited from comments by Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Markus Düttmann, Greg Kimak, and 
participants in the conference “Unlocking the Black Box: The Promise and Limits of Algorithmic Accountability 
in the Professions,” held on April 12, 2016 at Yale Law School, the 2nd Berlin Center for Consumer Policy Forum, 
held on April 13, 2016 at the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), the seminar on Digital Rights held in Turku on 
December 1-2, 2016, as well as a M-EPLI talk at the Maastricht European Private Law Institute, held on April 26, 
2016. All errors remain entirely our own.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 7
2
ABSTRACT
 The growing differentiation of services based on Big Data harbors the potential 
both for greater societal inequality and for greater equality. Anti-discrimination law and 
transparency alone, however, cannot do the job of curbing Big Data’s negative 
externalities while fostering its positive effects. 
To rein in Big Data’s potential, we adapt regulatory strategies from behavioral 
economics, contracts and criminal law theory. Four instruments stand out. First, active 
choice may be mandated between data collecting-services (paid by data) and data-free 
services (paid by money). Our suggestion provides concrete estimates for the price range 
of a data-free option, sheds new light on the monetization of data-collecting services, and 
proposes an “inverse predatory pricing” instrument to limit excessive pricing of the 
data-free option. Second, we propose using the doctrine of unconscionability to prevent 
contracts that unreasonably favor data-collecting companies. Third, we suggest 
democratizing data collection through regular user surveys and installation of data 
compliance officers partially elected by users. Finally, we trace back new Big Data 
personalization techniques to the old Hartian precept of treating like cases alike and 
different cases differently. If it is true that a speeding ticket over $50 is less of a disutility 
for a millionaire than for a welfare recipient, the income- and wealth-responsive fines 
powered by Big Data that we suggest offer a glimpse into the future of the mitigation of 
economic and legal inequality by personalized law. As we present these different 
strategies, we show how data collection can be coupled with attempts to prevent 
discrimination and exploitation of users. Finally, we discuss all four proposals in the 
context of different test cases: social media, student education software and credit and 
cell phone markets. 
 Many more examples could and should be discussed. In the face of increasing 
unease about the asymmetry of power between Big Data collectors and dispersed users, 
about differential legal treatment, and about the unprecedented dimensions of economic 
inequality, this paper proposes a new regulatory framework and research agenda to put 
the powerful engine of Big Data to the benefit of both the individual and societies 
adhering to basic notions of equality and non-discrimination.
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¶1  The promise of Big Data is big indeed: thanks to algorithms, clinical research 
allows seemingly unrelated symptoms to uncover the adverse effects of medicines; 
“smart grids” reduce energy consumption; congestion and pollution levels in cities can be 
reduced; and tailor-made education generates better learning outcomes.1
¶2  However, the side effects of new Big Data techniques have revealed both consumer 
protection and discrimination issues that lead us to an ever more unequal society. In 
addition to problems for all consumers, Big Data poses particular risks to vulnerable 
groups. Since basic life opportunities are based on predictive scoring, people are sorted 
into the “wheat” and the “chaff” for, inter alia, their health, housing, employment and 
travel opportunities.2 Opaque or incorrect scoring may result in significantly worsened 
economic conditions for those negatively affected.3 Moreover, personalization can 
disadvantage individuals when it is predicated on negative assumptions embedded in the 
very structure of the algorithm or biased towards the preferences of a statistical majority.4
As the “scored society”5 unfolds, every inch of the lives of individuals is recorded, 
measured, quantified and analyzed by an increasing array of data-collecting companies, 
data brokers and software tools. Big Data analytics have created estimated global 
revenues of $122 billion in 2015, an amount expected to increase by more than 50% over 
the next five years.6 Academics have extensively examined the impact of unilateral 
access to behavioral algorithms in the area of personalized advertising,7 showing how 
adverse targeting leads to suboptimal contracts.8 As Ryan Calo observes, firms have an 
incentive to engage in individualized ‘market manipulation’ whereby each consumer is 
1 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012). 
2
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
AND INFORMATION 3–11, ch. 2 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2014). 
3 Id. at 13–16; see CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY, ch. 10 (2015).
4 Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming, 2016). 
5 Moreover, in the wake of the Big Data economy, research has shown that government use of 
database screening can create blacklists of individuals and virtually reverse the presumption of innocence. 
See Margaret Hu, Big Data Backsliding, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015). Equally troubling, search engines 
are said to be able to influence election outcomes, Robert Epstein & Robert E. Robertson, The Search 
Engine Manipulation effect (SEME) and its possible impact on the outcomes of elections, American 
Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, (2015), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/112/33/E4512.full.pdf.  
6 Press Release, IDC, Worldwide Big Data and Business Analytics Revenues Forecast to Reach 
$187 Billion in 2019 (May 23, 2016), https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS41306516
[https://perma.cc/H7M2-DGUE]. 
7 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1016–18 (2014). 
8 Emir Kamenica, Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard Thaler, Helping Consumers Know Themselves,
101 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 417, 418 (2011) (reporting on adverse targeting, i.e., the conscious 
offer of sub-optimal contracts by companies to clients on the basis of the superior information of 
companies about the future use and spending patterns of their clients); for an overview of the interaction 
between Big Data, and other digital technologies, and contract law, see Stefan Grundmann & Philipp 
Hacker, The Digital Dimension as a Challenge to European Contract Law, in: EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Stefan Grundmann ed., forthcoming). 
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targeted on the basis of his or her specific set of biases or approached at a time when he 
or she is most vulnerable.9
¶3  However, this bleak picture conceals the potential of personalization through Big 
Data for the law of the future.10 Smart technologies enable differentiation of market 
transactions on an unprecedented scale. Depending on the underlying rationale for 
differential treatment, Big Data can be used to either entrench illegitimate discrimination 
or to reduce inequality. As with every new technology, this ambivalence is deeply 
inscribed into the very code of Big Data. The challenge for the legal regime is to facilitate 
the positive externalities of Big Data while reining in its potentially discriminatory use
¶4  Algorithmic transparency and due process11 are suggested as a necessary 
procedural antidote to some of the Big Data malaise. People deserve not only to access 
and correct their information but also to know how they are rated and ranked.12
Importantly, the Snowden revelations have demonstrated how social awareness can bring 
about reforms in other areas of privacy concern.13 Transparency regulations moreover 
carry a “relative political ease”14 and proposed smart disclosure policies such as “visceral 
notice”15 can help consumers make better-informed choices about services powered by 
data. But can transparency work on its own to combat troublesome discriminatory uses of 
Big Data or do we need to think of other methods of regulation?
¶5  While much ink has been spilled on remedying behavioral market failures that arise 
from personalized advertising,16 adverse targeting17 or more generally, the interplay of 
competition and cognitive biases,18 legal scholarship has only recently started to discuss 
regulatory solutions that address harms generated by Big Data. This article adds to the 
debate in two respects. First, unlike in other areas where federal law and the courts are 
9 Supra note 8, at 1007–18, and 1033.
10 See, e.g., Philipp Hacker, The Ambivalence of Algorithms. Gauging the Legitimacy of 
Personalized Law, in: PERSONAL DATA IN COMPETITION, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND IP LAW – TOWARDS
A HOLISTIC APPROACH? (Mor Bakhoum, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt & Gintare 
Surblyte, eds., forthcoming); id., Personalizing EU Private Law. From Disclosures to Nudges and 
Mandates, EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2914393; on 
personalized law more generally, see Ariel Porat & Lior Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and 
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014); O. Ben-Shahar & A. Porat, Personalizing
Negligence Law, 91 NYU L. REV. 627 (2016). 
11 Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014). 
12 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2; PASQUALE, supra note 2. 
13 The Snowden revelations triggered a significant public debate and legislative overhaul of 
surveillance measures that eventually led to the replacement of the Patriot Act with the USA Freedom Act 
of 2015. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline 
Over Monitoring Act of 2015. P. L. 114–23, §1(a).  
14 Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Petitions and Institutional Legitimacy, CARDOZO L. REV
(forthcoming 2016).   
15 Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1027 (2012).
16 See, e.g., FREDERIK ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF 
BEHAVIOURAL TARGETING (2015).
17 Kamenica, Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 8; PHILIPP HACKER, VERHALTENSÖKONOMIK UND 
NORMATIVITÄT [Behavioral Economics and Normativity] (forthcoming, on file with authors). 
18 See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 14–18 (2012); GEORGE A. AKERLOF &
ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS (2015); Michael Grubb, Overconfident Consumers in the 
Marketplace, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2015). 
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struggling to translate privacy losses into privacy harms,19 the unfair techniques with 
which data might be extracted for analytics can result in tangible economic harms that 
might substantially disadvantage some individuals.20 We show how Big Data can 
multiply discrimination in new and subtle ways. Second, we demonstrate how 
individualization through Big Data can actually be deployed to fight discrimination more 
effectively. Ultimately, we suggest regulatory strategies that couple transparency with 
some substantive protections to eliminate the danger of multiplying inequality through 
Big Data and instead enhance the prospect of improving equality.21
¶6  In Part I we outline the main challenges for the law posed by Big Data. First, we 
argue that through “smart discrimination” and “dual valence correlations,” Big Data is 
able to take societal inequalities to the next level. Second, we unearth Big Data’s less-
explored potential for remedying inequalities. In Part II, we outline the limits of some of 
the traditional approaches to Big Data in what we call “transparency as accountability” 
and “transparency as disclosure.” Thus, we develop a framework for reining in the big 
promise of Big Data through a new research agenda that combines transparency with 
substantial regulation. First, to prevent discrimination, we propose concrete strategies for 
offering data-free services next to unconscionability and the ex post evaluation of 
contracts. Furthermore, we analyze democratizing data collection as a regulatory tool. 
Finally, the paper is the first to suggest income or wealth-responsive fines as a way of 
remedying inequalities through the use of Big Data. Part III tests our premises in three 
case studies: social media, student education software and credit and cell phone markets. 
Part IV presents the tentative conclusions. 
I. BIG DATA AND THE LAW: MAJOR CHALLENGES
¶7  Data analytics lead to greater personalization of services. Before the advent of Big 
Data, consumers would, for the most part, see the same advertisements and receive the 
same offers. However, Big Data has changed the rules of the game. Individuals are 
treated differently now, based on their metadata such as their browsing history, their 
shopping behavior, or the articles they read in electronic newspapers. At the first level, 
this creates a problem of awareness, salience, and consent. As has been noted by 
numerous scholars, recent surveys suggest consumers’ and users’ unease with data 
collection and data mining. A survey conducted in 2015 by the Pew Research Center 
shows that only 7% of U.S. adults were somewhat or very confident that their record 
would remain private and secure with online advertisers.22 Fifty percent of U.S. adults 
19 Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011). 
20 For a categorization of harms provoked by algorithmic decision-making, see Pauline T. Kim, 
Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).  
21 For a detailed discussion of the interaction between legal equality and personalized law, see 
Philipp Hacker, The Ambivalence of Algorithms. Gauging the Legitimacy of Personalized Law, in: 
PERSONAL DATA IN COMPETITION, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND IP LAW – TOWARDS A HOLISTIC
APPROACH? (Mor Bakhoum, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt & Gintare Surblyte, eds., 
forthcoming). 
22 Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. 7 (May 20, 2015) http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-
attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/PUU2-BJ7J ]. 
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would like to prevent online advertisers from saving records of their activity for any 
length of time;23 and more than 90% of U.S. adults would like to be in control of the 
information others can collect from them.24 In the 2014 Pew Research Center survey, 
more than nine out of ten U.S. adults noted that consumers have lost control over 
companies’ online collection and use of data.25 Nonetheless, the vast majority of citizens 
continue to use data-collecting services such as Google or Facebook without sufficiently 
protecting their privacy by means of proxy servers, encryption, TOR, or other technical 
measures.26 This points to a flagrant attitude-action gap that regulation, including the 
tools we shall propose, can help close. Consumers often do not have the necessary 
technological knowledge to protect their privacy. Further, lock-in or network effects 
explain why many users of social networks remain faithful to the services they receive, 
even if their privacy is compromised.27 The market does not seem to offer effective 
mechanisms to narrow the attitude-action gap on its own, and the consequences can be 
dire, especially for vulnerable groups. 
¶8  Importantly, however, we argue that at the second level, beyond privacy concerns 
and consent, the growing differentiation of services based on personal data harbors the 
potential for both greater societal inequality and for greater equality— i.e., Big Data is 
instrumental for both more and less discrimination.28 The reason for the Janus-faced 
character of personalization can be traced back to Hart’s precept of treating like cases 
alike and different cases differently.29 This basic tenet is reflected to some extent in the 
U.S. constitutional tradition of anti-subordination that “impugned facially neutral 
practices with a racially disparate impact, while legitimating affirmative action,”30 and it 
has also been spelled out by the European Court of Justice: “ [d]iscrimination consists 
solely in the application of different rules to comparable situations or in the application of 
the same rule to differing situations.”31 Treating different individuals differently does not 
per se amount to discrimination or foster inequality. Rather, the core question is whether 
the respective situations are comparable, which in turn depends on whether good reasons 
can be advanced for distinguishing one individual from another. The ambivalence of Big 
Data arises from the fact that differential treatment can be premised upon a variety of 
23 Id. at 9. 
24 Id. at 5. 
25Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RES. CTR., 3 (Nov. 
12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ [https://perma.cc/X5NS-
BDEU]. 
26 Madden & Rainie, supra note 22, at 8–9. 
27 In order to fight lock-in effects, in 2012 the European Commission proposed a far-reaching data 
portability right in its data privacy legislative reform package. The currently adopted EU-wide general data 
protection regulation introduces a mellowed down version of the right. See Art. 20 of Regulation 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J., (L 119) 45.
28 This applies both to intentional discrimination and remedial discrimination. 
29 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 599 
(1958). 
30 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition— Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 2 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 12 (2003).
31 Case C-283/83, Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz, E.C.R. 1984, 3791, para. 7. 
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personal characteristics and can be deployed to either combat or entrench discriminatory 
practices.
A. Big Data Exacerbating Inequality 
¶9  Along with problems generally associated with consumer protection, the use of Big 
Data creates inequality whenever it facilitates the differentiation between persons based 
on traits of their personality or patterns of their behavior thought to be discriminatory, 
such as traits identified within a protected class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.32 As Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale,33 Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst,34 as 
well as Tal Zarsky35 and others,36 have persuasively argued, the use of correlations 
uncovered by data science gives rise to inequality on an unprecedented scale triggered by 
what we term here “smart discrimination.” Consider the example of racial discrimination: 
in the old days, this type of discrimination was often rather obvious. The refusal to sell 
goods to consumers because of the color of their skin, or even the refusal to ship 
merchandise to ZIP code areas predominantly inhabited by African-American or Latino 
communities, was a clear sign of racial discrimination.37 This is not to say that more 
subtle forms of discrimination did not exist before the advent of Big Data.38 However, 
one of the striking characteristics of the era of Big Data is the ability to uncover 
counterintuitive correlations. Therefore, it is now possible to differentiate seemingly 
neutral characteristics that, while unnoticed by the general public, correlate with 
discriminatory traits. Examples include the distance from home to work (which can 
correlate with racial background),39 criminal records (which can correlate with racial 
background),40 or individual working days versus holidays (which indicate religious 
beliefs).41 If these correlations become integrated into the search algorithms of platforms 
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17. 
33 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2. 
34 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4. 
35 Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375
(2014). 
36 See, e.g., Toon Calders and Indr Žliobait, Why Unbiased Computational Processes Can 
Lead to Discriminative Decision Procedures, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 43 (Bart Custers, Toon Calders, Bart Schermer, 
& Tal Zarsky eds., 2013). 
37 See Toon Calders & Sicco Verwer, Three Naïve Bayes Approaches for 
Discrimination-Free Classification, 21 DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 277, 278 (2010); cf.
Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1394–95. 
38 See, e.g., Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial 
Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. .REV.
SOC. 181 (2008). 
39 Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 20, 2013) (citing the case of 




40 Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 22 CRIME & JUST. 201 (1997). 
41 Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1395. 
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offering goods and services, Big Data will allow for subliminal forms of discrimination to 
which we turn below. 
1. Dual Valence Correlations 
¶10  Why would the providers of platforms implement such discriminatory strategies in 
the first place? The answer is fourfold. First, discrimination can be based on institutional 
arrangements that follow patterns of implicit, rather than intentional, bias.42 Institutional 
discrimination has received significant attention in the sociological literature43 and might 
be considered a key driver of the persistence of discrimination in the post-civil rights era. 
This is also highlighted by the so-called ‘Podesta Report’ on the ambivalent impact of 
Big Data issued by the Executive Office of the President.44 Second, machine learning 
procedures may perpetuate biases inherent in the data used to train the algorithm, an issue 
we address in more detail below.45 Third, it might be the case that the provider either 
harbors explicit discriminatory feelings or gains utility by discriminating against 
consumers based on their racial background, sexual orientation, etc.46 Fourth, there is the 
so-far underappreciated47 potential for discrimination arising from the interplay of market 
forces in which the providers themselves are neutral but they respond to the 
discriminatory preferences of other market actors. As Christine Jolls and Ian Ayres have 
persuasively argued, such “rational” discrimination can be the product of profit 
maximization under certain constraints.48
¶11  While others have dealt with the first example (institutional discrimination),49 we 
now turn to some cases that illustrate the other three categories just mentioned. A 
problem of inequality arises when certain parameters for personalization of offers have a 
dual valence—i.e., when they correlate in a statistically significant way both with traits 
42 This is the form of discrimination Barocas and Selbst focus on. See Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 4, at 3-4. 
43 See, e.g., Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 185, 198; Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M. 
McPartland, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded from Equal Employment Opportunities: Research on 
Labor Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 5 (1987). 




45 See infra notes 50 et seq. and accompanying text; for an overview, see, e.g., Indre Zliobaite, A
Survey on Measuring Indirect Discrimination in Machine Learning, Working Paper (2015), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.00148. 
46 See, e.g., Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1385–86. 
47 But see Alistair Croll, Big Data Is Our Generation’s Civil Rights Issue, and We 
Don’t Know It, SOLVE FOR INTERESTING (July 31, 2012), http://solveforinteresting.com/big-data-is-our-
generations-civil-rights-issue-and-we-dont-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/L24Q-4CN4]; however, discussion in 
the legal literature of market forces leading to discrimination has been scarce so far, with the partial 
exception of Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 22–23, 44, and a brief mention in Zarsky, supra note 35, at 
1387.
48 Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 685–86 (2003);
Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817, 842–44 (1991). 
49 See supra note 42. 
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that would constitute a legitimate reason for differentiation and with discriminatory 
traits.50 Let us consider the hypothetical case of an online platform that sells used cars. In 
deciding whether to make an offer to a potential buyer, the platform provider analyzes the 
payment history of the buyer on the basis of information they collect on their own and 
through related platforms; furthermore, as far as possible, the provider gathers 
information on the buyer’s credit history. From the data, the platform calculates a 
combined credit and payment score (CCPS). To potential buyers with a better CCPS, the 
platform makes cheaper offers for the same types of cars than to buyers with a worse 
CCPS. The platform provider defends this strategy by noting that buyers with a lower 
CCPS are costlier since they are more likely to default on their payments. Taken on its 
own, this would constitute a sufficient economic reason for price discrimination.51
However, let us further assume that the CCPS also correlates with racial characteristics: 
African-Americans, for an intricate set of reasons stemming largely from the educational 
system,52 tend to have lower CCPSs. Thus, the algorithm provides the car dealer with a 
tool to discriminate against African-American consumers while ostensibly following an 
economic rationale. This concern is not entirely theoretical: in a much-cited study 
conducted before the advent of Big Data, Ian Ayres and colleagues were able to show 
how car dealers’ offers depend heavily on the racial background of the offeree, with 
African-American consumers getting worse deals than white consumers.53 If anything, 
Big Data and the sharing economy can exacerbate the trend.54 For example, Benjamin 
Edelman and colleagues have demonstrated in an oft-cited field experiment that users 
with African-American names are 16% less likely to be accepted by Airbnb hosts than 
their white counterparts.55 Additionally, David Wang and colleagues show, with data 
50 Cf. Calders & Verwer,  supra note 37, at 279; Zarsky, supra note 35, at 1389; Barocas & Selbst, 
supra note 4, at 20–22.
51 Cf. Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry about When We Worry about Price Discrimination? – 
The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 41, 70–74 (2014).
52 See, e.g., RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY
MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER, ch. 8 (2011). 
53 Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car,
85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995). This narrative is part of a broader problem: as computer scientists have 
pointed out, it is extremely difficult to construct attributes with predictive quality that are uncorrelated to 
any discriminatory traits. See, e.g., Calders & Verwer, supra note 37, at 278 (noting that “simply removing 
the sensitive attribute from the training dataset does not solve the problem, due to the so-called ‘red-lining 
effect’,” i.e., indirect discrimination through correlations). Therefore, whichever target variable is chosen 
for data mining, there will always be a potential for – conscious or unconscious – discrimination. 
54 Benjamin G. Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing 
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
17), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2701902 [https://perma.cc/M2EE-L33L] (discussing the rise of discrimination 
in the sharing economy in general); Alex Rosenblat, Karen Levy, Solon Barocas & Tim Hwang, 
Discriminating Tastes: Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Bias, INTELLIGENCE & AUTONOMY (October
2016), http://datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Discriminating_Tastes_Customer_Ratings_as_Vehicles_for_Bias.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z3TT-NCJU] (identifying customer ratings of Uber drivers as a potential transmission 
vehicle for racial bias). 
55 Edelman, Luca & Svirsky, supra note 54, at 3. 
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from California, that Asian-American hosts on Airbnb earn 20% less for a single 
bedroom rental than white hosts.56
¶12  What is new about this phenomenon? Certainly, economic reasoning linked to the 
risk of default has been used in the past to veil discrimination. Given the persistence of 
biased preferences in the digital economy, Big Data, however, presents an entirely new 
stage in the history of discrimination precisely because it allows for hitherto unnoticed 
correlations to take center stage. Even seemingly mundane and harmless characteristics 
of personalization might mask illegitimate discriminatory preferences.57 This is 
particularly problematic in the case of dual valence correlations since the “legitimate 
correlation” may present a sufficient justification to pass the antidiscrimination test under 
the disparate treatment58 and the disparate impact doctrines59 of Title VII.60 The current 
account of the antidiscrimination doctrine holds that disparate treatment cases concern 
intentional discrimination based on a protected characteristic such as gender or race, 
while disparate impact cases target practices that are facially neutral but might have 
discriminatory effects. However, due to the currently narrow interpretation of “disparate 
impact” by the Supreme Court, antidiscrimination law alone does not seem equipped to 
deal with the cases we described above.61 Therefore, the law must leave the comfortable 
path of traditional antidiscrimination law to fight these new types of data-driven 
discrimination. This is what Part II.B. of the article will address. 
2. “Smart Discrimination”
¶13  Next, consider the example of a platform offering apartments for rent. As is well 
known, and corroborated by the recent Airbnb study,62 some landlords have a biased 
56 David Wang, Stephen Xi & John Gilheany, The Model Minority? Not on Airbnb.com: A 
Hedonic Pricing Model to Quantify Racial Bias against Asian Americans, TECH. SCI. (September 1, 2015), 
http://techscience.org/a/2015090104/ [https://perma.cc/68KB-WRN4]. 
57 Cf. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 23. 
58 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1989) (holding that if a mix of motives 
led to a decision by an employer, one of the motives being illegitimate, “the defendant may avoid a finding 
of liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even 
if it had not taken the plaintiff's [discriminating feature] into account”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (noting that once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the “burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection”). 
59 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2015) (establishing that a hiring practice with disparate 
impact is legitimate if it is job-related and a business necessity); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 
41 (noting that “there is good reason to believe that any or all of the data mining models predicated on 
legitimately job-related traits pass muster under the business necessity defense”).  
60 On business justification in the context of Title VII, see Jolls, supra note 48, at 665–66; Richard 
A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 517–18, 522 
(2003); for a detailed analysis of discriminatory data mining in the light of Title VII, see Barocas & Selbst, 
supra note 4, at 24–46. 
61 But see Pauline T. Kim, supra note 19, at 38–43. Kim suggests a revisionist reading of Title VII 
that advances a prohibition on classification bias in the employment context. We are sympathetic to this 
reading of the text that optimizes the advantages of workforce analytics while curbing its risks. However, 
with Kim, we are skeptical too since, as she writes, “existing doctrinal forms often exert gravitational pull 
on our thinking.” 
62 Edelman, Luca & Svirsky, supra note 54, at 1. 
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penchant for white and well-educated tenants.63 Let us further suppose that access to the 
hypothetical platform is free for potential tenants but charges a service fee to the 
landlords when they offer their apartments for rent. The provider will have an incentive 
to implement a discriminatory search algorithm under two conditions. First, it must know 
of the landlords’ discriminatory preferences, which can be reasonably assumed given the 
empirical data available. Second, the discriminatory strategy must not be noticed by the 
majority of the persons discriminated against (for fear of public outrage, or 
discontinuation of the use of the platform by this group). Under these conditions, 
algorithmic discriminatory strategies may be implemented as a screening device to 
channel the “better” potential tenants—e.g., the white and well-educated—to the 
landlords’ offers. The landlords’ willingness to pay a higher service fee to the provider 
will depend on the perceived “quality” of the applicants they receive through the 
platform, thus creating an additional incentive for the provider to channel the kind of 
tenants that landlords would like to see responding to their offers. However, the success 
and popularity of the platform would also depend on having as many users as possible. 
Therefore, an openly discriminatory strategy would, beyond legal concerns, be 
economically inefficient. Thus, the provider will have an incentive to covertly tweak the 
algorithm in a way that, for non-white users, rearranges the list of apartments. If, 
moreover, service fees are calculated on the basis of monthly rent, the more expensive 
apartments will be more profitable for the provider. Ultimately, maximizing the 
satisfaction of apartment owners will be of the highest priority for the platform provider. 
An economically efficient, discriminatory search strategy could therefore rearrange the 
list of apartments so that the more expensive ones are displayed first to white users.64
This would hinder access to high-quality housing for non-white users. 
¶14  The described effect is particularly relevant to areas of the law that ban 
discrimination in public offerings of goods or services. Examples include the US Fair 
Housing Act65 or Sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act,66 and, in Europe, the 
EU Antidiscrimination Directive.67 However, a similar effect can also raise Title VII 
employment issues if the employer reckons that their customers or coworkers will have 
discriminatory preferences and decides to adapt his or her recruitment policy 
accordingly.68 We see Big Data opening the realm of hidden or “smart” discrimination, 
which can go unnoticed by those discriminated against. Algorithmic discriminatory 
strategies might be used either by persons actively seeking to discriminate against others 
or by those seeking merely to maximize their revenue. The use of algorithms creates 
unfortunate economic incentives for “dual valence” and “smart” discrimination. 
63 Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 188–89; see also John Yinger, Measuring Racial 
Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986). 
64 For empirical data on such price steering mechanisms, see Aniko Hannak, Gary Soeller, David 
Lazer, Alan Mislove & Christo Wilson, Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce 
Web Sites, in: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 305,
309-310 (2014). 
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2015). 
66 See Ayres, supra note 48, at 821. 
67 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180/22), art. 3(1)(h). 
68 See Jolls, supra note 48, at 686–87.
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B. Big Data Mitigating Inequality 
¶15  While Big Data undoubtedly harbors the potential to expand illegitimate 
discrimination in new and subtle ways, it could also contribute to greater economic 
equality. For several years now, both lawyers and economists have been debating the 
impact of mounting economic inequality in Western societies and potential strategies for 
battling this worrying tendency.69 Conspicuously left out of the picture so far is the far-
reaching potential for mitigating economic inequality by organizing both markets and the 
legal system by means of Big Data. Ideally, the very same strategies used to decrease 
economic inequality simultaneously serve to foster legal equality. In Part II, we shall 
argue that wealth- and income-responsive fines could fulfill this dual goal.70
¶16  The preceding discussion has demonstrated the opportunity structures that Big Data 
creates for “dual valence” and “smart” discrimination. However, the same strategies can 
be tweaked to differentiate between different market actors in a legitimate way. Imagine 
the aggressive tendencies of the discriminatory car dealer exhibited when the price 
charged for a certain good is actually positively correlated with the income or wealth of 
the offeree. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Amazon is in fact already using such price 
discrimination strategies to demand higher prices from Mac users than from Windows 
users, the rationale being that the average consumption budget of a Mac user is higher 
than that of a Windows user.71 If the type of operating system used is indeed a fair proxy 
for one’s consumption budget, which in turn depends crucially on income and wealth, 
then the strategy used by Amazon does incrementally lower economic inequality. A 
similar effect can be achieved by geostrategic pricing in which the price of a good is 
determined by the location of the IP address of the user or by the ZIP code of the 
shipping address.72 More generally, to the extent that algorithm-driven price 
discrimination increasingly approximates the reservation price of the potential buyer, it 
should, on average, lead to higher prices for more affluent buyers who tend to have a 
greater ability to pay for products.73 While this statement needs to be qualified for some 
69 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer, 
trans., 2014); FRANÇOIS BOURGUIGNON, THE GLOBALIZATION OF INEQUALITY (Thomas Scott-Railton, 
trans., 2015); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY. HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012); WILKINSON & PICKETT, supra note 52; David Grewal, The Laws of 
Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014) (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2014)); for a sweeping critique of the impact of Big Data on inequality, see CATHY O’NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION. HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY
(2016).
70 Infra, Part II.B.4. 
71 CHRISTOPH KUCKLICK, DIE GRANULARE GESELLSCHAFT. WIE DAS DIGITALE UNSERE 
WIRKLICHKEIT AUFLÖST [The Granular Society: How Digitization Dissolves our Reality] 129–30 (2014); 
similar tactics are reported of the travel website Orbitz, see Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to 
Pricier Hotels, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 23, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882.
72 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
73 On price discrimination in the digital economy, see Hannak et al., supra note 64; ARIEL
EZARCHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION 85-130 (2016); id., The Rise of Behavioural 
Discrimination, 37 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 485 (2016).
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algorithmic pricing techniques,74 the law, we suggest, can use similar data-driven 
strategies to combat economic and legal inequality in unprecedented ways. 
II. REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
¶17  This brings us to a discussion of potential regulatory solutions for the challenges 
just described. Simple bans on data collection would often not work, either because they 
are overreaching, potentially unconstitutional,75 and politically inopportune, or because 
the huge advantages of data collection and processing for companies and consumers 
would immediately create a black market with even less oversight. What may be 
practicable, however, are some mild regulatory steps designed to minimize the harms of 
discriminatory uses of Big Data and enhance equality through data collection and 
processing.
¶18  The first and most frequently promoted regulatory tool puts an emphasis on 
transparency. We outline the different contexts in which transparency-as-accountability 
and transparency-as-disclosure to the consumer is invoked. However, the limits of 
disclosure brought about with new empirical research in behavioral and experimental 
economics lead us to consider, as a second step, substantial forms of regulation. By 
decreasing company access to citizen data, these regulations aim not only to make 
citizens aware of the algorithms that sort them, potentially reducing the attitude-action 
gap in the privacy domain, but more importantly to significantly limit the amount of data 
available to companies in the first place. If data is the source of discrimination in the 
digital age, reducing the availability of the data of some users will reduce the potential for 
discrimination. This particularly holds true if vulnerable groups are given the ability to 
opt out of data collection. Furthermore, the regulatory tools we contemplate leverage Big 
Data in novel ways to combat economic and legal inequality. In order to explain the 
necessity for such proposals, however, we shall first critique the current focus on 
transparency as an absolute antidote to data-driven evils. 
74 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 6 (2015) (noting 
that price steering and price discrimination may also have a regressive effect: “the economic intuition that 
differential pricing allows firms to serve more price-sensitive customers at a lower price-point may even be 
overturned. If price-sensitive customers also tend to be less experienced, or less knowledgeable about 
potential pitfalls, they might more readily accept offers that appear fine on the surface but are actually full 
of hidden charges.”) Generally, in unrestricted price discrimination, the price perceived by the buyer should 
approximate the reservation price; however, boundedly rational, inattentive and uninformed buyers will 
often underestimate the final price (and thus perceive the price to be lower) if it is sufficiently shrouded by 
hidden charges, see Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 505 (2006). The interactions of 
these two phenomena (price misperceptions and approximation of reservation price) most likely lead to 
ambivalent consequences of price discrimination concerning economic equality; cf. also ARIEL EZARCHI &
MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION 85-130 118, 120 (2016).
75 Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (arguing that since the First 
Amendment protects the right to create knowledge, data is speech; if accepted, such an understanding 
makes any ban on data collection constitutionally suspicious). 
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A. Parceling out Transparency 
¶19  Transparency figures prominently on the agenda of rule makers, whether as a part 
of the revived76 parlance of ‘good governance’ of the 2000s in international relations and 
administrative law or as a top feature of the ambitious open government initiative of 
President Obama in the domestic realm.77 It is argued that the modern turn to 
transparency dates back to “the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s—well before the Internet—as 
reform-oriented politicians, journalists, watchdog groups, and social movements gained 
new leverage.”78 Transparency is promoted throughout a wide range of contexts, but 
when it comes to regulation, there has been little attempt to critically parcel out the 
different components that constitute transparency as an umbrella concept.79 When is 
sunlight the “best disinfectant”80 and when is it a mere first step to achieving a desired 
outcome?
¶20  In the context of government accountability, transparency-as-accountability has 
served its purpose well. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),81 first enacted in 1966 
and amended several times since then, applies to federal executive agencies. It creates “a 
judicially enforceable policy that favors a general philosophy of full disclosure . . . based 
on democratic political theory and a philosophy of open government.”82 Under FOIA, 
numerous requests have been made by public interest organizations and law clinics that 
pursue surveillance reform and defend consumer privacy rights. The transmission belt 
that FOIA offers is premised on the idea that the pressure on the government, created by 
public debate as a result of the disclosures, will translate into corrective measures. 
However, as the revelations of whistleblowers show, at the outer boundaries of the FOIA 
model lies the realization that we cannot request information if we do not know it exists. 
¶21  When it comes to the private sector, users and consumers are often unaware of the 
degree to which their personal information is collected and processed by companies they 
interact with. At first glance, it would seem that transparency-as-disclosure to consumers 
is a sensible regulatory strategy. The definition of informational or data privacy as the 
ability to determine for oneself what others may collect and how they use one’s 
76 Found in the famous ‘Buon Governo-Mal Governo’ 1338-9 fresco paintings of Lorenzetti in a 
room of Palazzio Pubblico in Siena, Italy, the allegory of good governance has traveled across time from 
Aristotle’s Politics to 17th-18th century German economists to present-day United Nations policy 
documents. See Hans-Jürgen Wagener, Good Governance, Welfare and Transformation, 1 EUR. J. COMP.
ECON. 127 (2004).
77 For the Obama administration’s wide-ranging number of initiatives in this respect, see 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/open/about [https://perma.cc/H59J-2G9K].  
78 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 1945-1975 (2015).
79 Natali Helberger, Form Matters: Informing Consumers Effectively, (Amsterdam L. Sch. 
Research Paper 2013–71, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354988
[https://perma.cc/Z4YT-PZZK] (pointing out that our first regulatory grasp is to transparency but there is 
little consideration of where it works and where it does not). 
80 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
81 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1989). 
82 Michael Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, Privacy Rights Versus FOIA 
Disclosure Policy: The “Uses and Effects” Double Standard in Access to Personally Identifiable 
Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2003) (noting that despite FOIA’s 
successes, the authors insist for a narrower interpretation of the statute’s privacy exceptions when the 
information is in the public interest).
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 7
16
information83 has entrenched a model of privacy-as-control, which in turn brought about 
the Notice and Choice model for regulating consumer privacy in the U.S. There is no 
generally applicable U.S. federal privacy law that mandates privacy statements. Several 
sectoral laws require different degrees of disclosure of how personal information is 
collected and used,84 and so do a number of state privacy laws.85 The Notice and Choice 
paradigm has traditionally been oriented toward the individual consumer who is 
supposed, after reading and sufficiently comprehending the terms and conditions of the 
Notice, to act upon it by choosing to give or withhold his or her consent (and therefore, 
exercise choice). However, the empirical benefits of consumer disclosure are increasingly 
disputed and indeed seem to be limited. First, at the core of the model is an inherent 
tension between the length and efficacy of privacy notices.86 Second, and equally 
problematic, is the fallacy of consumers’ “free” choice that can arise from a lack of 
market options or from the set of “usual suspects”: limited rationality, information 
asymmetries, and collective action problems.87
1. The Limits of Transparency-as-Accountability 
¶22  As Frank Pasquale has persuasively argued, when we enter the domain of Big Data, 
there is an ironic mismatch between the ever-growing secrecy of companies about their 
business conduct and an ever-greater quantification of individuals by these very same 
companies.88 The ways in which data collection and processing are accomplished are 
opaque and exclusive.89 To counter the hermetic tendencies inherent to data mining, 
Citron and Pasquale have called for greater transparency in algorithmic decision-
making90 as well as for interactive modeling.91 While this proposal would certainly 
83 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). For a critique, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle & 
Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin's Privacy Homo Economicus, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (2014). 
84 The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) mandates that websites or online 
services that are directed toward or knowingly collect the personal information of children under the age of 
13 years, give a privacy notice. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (Pub. L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681-728, enacted 
October 21, 1998), implementing regulations at 16 CFR Part 312.
85 A prominent example, the California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) requires that 
any website or online service that collects personally identifiable information from California residents, as 
defined by California law, posts its privacy policy. The actual scope of the statute is broader since it applies 
to any website to which Californians have provided their data, see California Business and Professions 
Code § 22575(a). 
86 Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DDALUS 32, 36 (2011) 
argues that: “[a]chieving transparency means conveying information…[however] . . . [i]f notice . . . finely 
details every . . . [relevant fact] . . . we know that it is unlikely to be understood, let alone read. But 
summarizing practices in the style of, say, nutrition labels is no more helpful because it drains away 
important details, ones that are likely to make a difference.”). The use of vague and indeterminate language 
in privacy notices is another persistent issue.
87 For a poignant early critique, see Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. 
REV. 815, 825 (1999).
88 PASQUALE, supra note 2; see also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of 
Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 42 (2014). In the words of the authors, “[w]hile big data 
pervasively collects all manner of private information, the operations of big data itself are almost entirely 
shrouded in legal and commercial secrecy.”  
89 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 17; PASQUALE, supra note 2. 
90 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 26; PASQUALE, supra note 2, at 1, ch. 5. 
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enhance oversight over data mining and shed light on otherwise obscure data processing 
practices, companies’ sharing of code and models with the greater public has three key 
disadvantages. First, the intricacies of data mining are often the most precious resource 
for the industry; a transparency requirement would therefore not only threaten 
companies’ business models but might also be opposed for hampering innovation in the 
sector. Second, making publicly available the factors crucial for certain scoring 
techniques might provide opportunities for those scored to act strategically—i.e., to send 
artificial or exaggerated signals about the most important factors in a model. They might 
thus essentially “game the system.”92 This is not only well-documented by research on 
search engine optimization,93 but also more generally by economic signaling theory.94
Third, the complexity of advanced algorithms is so great that their architecture design is 
often hard to fully comprehend, even by the computer scientists who contribute to 
algorithmic development.95 This is a result of the collaborative dimension of generating 
code in which different tech engineers contribute different pieces at different moments in 
time. Finally, making behavioral algorithms understandable to the wider public would be 
a daunting enterprise.96
¶23  Transparency-as-accountability can potentially work in the area of Big Data as 
consumer groups, academics, or regulatory bodies can exercise pressure97 so that 
businesses embed algorithms that are not prejudicial to racial or other minorities. The 
success stories are still few and far between, however, and those few successes are not 
terribly impressive. Disclosure has arguably been effective to some extent in other areas 
of privacy concern, such as dealing with data security breaches.98 Perhaps if reputational 
damage can nudge companies into changing their practices in some areas, it can also do 
the trick when it comes to Big Data. One (modest) example is Facebook’s changed 
default settings of geo-location on Facebook Messenger after a researcher put into place a 
browser application that publicized the scope of geo-location data collection that 
91 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 28–29. 
92 Cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 20, 26 (noting, however, that in some areas gaming may 
be difficult to achieve). 
93 Jakub Zilincan, Search Engine Optimization, CBU INTERNAT’L CONF. PROC. (2015), 
journals.cz/index.php/CBUConference2013/article/download/645/599; Amy van Looy, Search Engine 
Optimization, in SOCIAL MEDIA MANAGEMENT 113 (Amy van Looy, ed., 2016). 
94 Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 24 J. LAW & ECON. 491, 511 (1981) (noting that the signaling party will focus unilaterally on 
enhancing the signal and neglect other dimensions of product quality which are harder to monitor). 
95 Cf. PASQUALE, supra note 2, at 6. 
96 While daunting, the project is certainly not impossible, at least on the long run. An informed 
minority could potentially exert a disciplining influence. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening
in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630
(1979); Citron and Pasquale suggest that the “[Federal Trade Commission] FTCs expert technologists” 
could represent such a minority, equipped furthermore with supervisory powers. Citron & Pasquale, supra
note 2, at 25. 
97  The public’s inability to comment on obscure source code has been said to obstruct the 
effectiveness of Privacy Impact Assessments under the E-Government Act, see Citron & Pasquale, supra
note 2, at 10-11. 
98 Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L.
REV.
913, (2007). 
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Facebook effectuated through its initial default setting.99 However, the relative obscurity 
of technology hides personalization from end users and watchdogs alike, limiting their 
ability to object to (or express any opinion on) how individuals are steered around the 
Web. If, alternatively, code is shared only with supervisory authorities, control over one’s 
data is put solely in the hands of a regulatory agency, contradicting the long-lasting 
perception in the U.S. of privacy-as-control and the influential rhetoric of putting 
individuals back into the driver seat of their data. Ultimately, much like with the 
limitations of transparency-as-accountability under FOIA, the main problem with 
transparency-as-accountability in the context of Big Data remains the lack of information 
on the way algorithms are built. 
2. The Limits of Transparency-as-Consumer-Disclosure 
¶24  The key issue with consumer disclosure is that in order for it to work, a sufficient 
number of market participants needs to read, understand, and act upon the disclosed 
information. To begin with, it is important to understand that even according to 
traditional regulatory theory, not everyone needs to read the notice. An informed minority 
can exert disciplining influence on the less-informed market participants.100 However, the 
informed minority hypothesis has increasingly come under attack. On the one hand, 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and others have shown in a series of papers that in the case of 
end-user license agreements (EULAs), virtually no one takes the time to screen the 
agreements for surprising or exploitative terms.101 The authors of the studies conclude 
that an informed minority does not exist, at least with respect to EULAs. Similarly, in 
their much-discussed work on the limits of disclosure Lauren Willis and Margaret Radin 
have powerfully argued that the systemic neglect of disclosure is a rampant phenomenon 
in many other markets, as well.102 On the other hand, even if an informed minority does 
exist in some markets (such as arguably with institutional investors in financial 
markets),103 the personalization effect of Big Data increasingly enables providers to 
99 Aran Khanna, Facebook's Privacy Incident Response: A Study of Geolocation Sharing on 
Facebook Messenger, TECH. SCI. (2015).
100 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 96; David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 
(1986). 
101 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations 
of the ALI's “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165 (2011); Yannis Bakos, 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to 
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014). 
102 Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory 
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. (2006); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA
L. REV. (2008) (arguing further that the attempt to educate consumers on financial matters in order to 
improve the workability of disclosure is untenable at best); MARGARET J. RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) (demonstrating how the use of boilerplate 
language in disclosure has degraded traditional notions of consent and contract, and sacrificed core rights 
whose loss threatens the democratic order); see also OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE
THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
103 See, e.g., STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: ORGANIZATION, FINANCE AND 
CAPITAL MARKETS, § 9: DISCLOSURE (2012). 
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discriminate between better- and less-informed customers so that the spillover effects of 
the presumed informed minority are substantially limited. More importantly, Big Data 
would be able to identify loyalty: a loyal customer is one who does not compare shops, 
and, thus, there would be no reason for businesses to offer better prices to the loyal 
customer.
¶25  In response to critics, legal scholars have recently called for cognitively optimizing 
disclosure. “Smart” disclosures use multilayered formats, graphic explanations, images, 
traffic lights, and symbols.104 However, as empirically proven by Alessandro Acquisti 
and others, people tend to perceive the disclosure as a “seal.”105 Further, in a recent 
paper, Omri Ben-Shahar and Adam Chilton have found that the most-often recommended 
strategies for simplifying disclosure do not have an effect on addressees; in fact, 
disclosees ignore equally standard and cognitively optimized privacy disclosures.106 This 
study is particularly pertinent to the prospect of using smart disclosure techniques in the 
realm of Big Data since the authors manipulated the design of privacy notices in what 
concerns an area of particularly sensitive information—sexual practices. Despite the fact 
that highly intimate data was concerned, the participants in the study took an average of 
only 19 seconds to look at the cognitively optimized privacy notice and only an average 
of 13 seconds for the standard version.107 The cognitive optimization of disclosures can in 
fact be useful once people start reading the notice.108 However, the potential of disclosure 
remains limited first and foremost because of the limited motivation individuals have to 
attend to the disclosed information.109 At least in the domain of Big Data, where we have 
shown that the stakes are critical for the life of the individuals concerned, the results of 
Omri Ben-Shahar and Adam Chilton110 should be a cautionary note for those striving to 
achieve ever better salience in privacy notices. Instead, we suggest coupling disclosure 
techniques that rely on the privacy-as-control paradigm with more substantial types of 
regulation.
104 Calo, supra note 15; Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter 
Consumers, HARV. BUS. REV. 3 (Jan.-Feb. 2013); Philipp Hacker, Nudge 2.0 – The Future of Behavioural 
Analysis of Law, in Europe and Beyond: A Review of 'Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective,' Edited 
by Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony, 24 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 297, 313–14 (2016). 
105 Idris Adjerid, Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Sleights of 
Privacy: Framing, Disclosures and the Limits of Transparency (2013), SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY &
SECURITY (SOUPS), Newcastle, UK. 
106 Omri Ben-Shahar & Adam S. Chilton, Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental 
Test, 45 Journal of Legal Studies S41 (2016). 
107 Ben-Shahar & Chilton, supra note 106, at 14, Supplementary Material at 17. Since the notices 
contained between 500 and 900 words and since an average reader can read about 300 words per minute, it 
can be inferred that the participants were not motivated enough – despite the high stakes of collection of 
intimate information – to read, let alone cognitively digest the disclosures. Id. at 22. 
108 NICK CHATER, STEFFEN HUCK & ROMAN INDERST, CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING IN RETAIL
INVESTMENT SERVICES: A BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 336–37 (2010), www.vse-
lee.cz/files/useruploads/eu_consumer_behaviour_final_report.pdf.
109 See Adrian Weser, Die informative Warenkennzeichnung [Informational Leaflets for Goods], J.
CONST. POL’Y 80, 85 (reporting a Swedish field study according to which only 3% of participants evaluated 
furniture in a department store according to information leaflets attached to the furniture). 
110 Ben-Shahar & Chilton, supra note 106. 
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B. Substantial Regulation 
¶26  The most obvious way to tackle issues of discrimination by means of substantial 
regulation is antidiscrimination law. However, traditional antidiscrimination law, as 
Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst have convincingly shown,111 is unable to cope with 
data-driven forms of discrimination. As we have noted above, this chiefly results from 
the difficulty in reconciling the doctrine of disparate impact with discrimination hidden in 
“dual-valence” correlations and “smart” discrimination.112 Therefore, we turn to novel 
tools, which aim to give citizens greater control over their data in the first place. With this 
lever, we hope to mitigate legal inequality, not through remedying and controlling 
disparate impact, but through substantially decreasing access to data on which data-
driven discrimination can be built. As a second step, we inquire into the potential for 
actively using Big Data in regulation to combat economic and legal inequality. 
¶27  Substantial regulation can take a variety of forms and draw on a large number of 
regulatory tools, ranging from soft paternalistic nudges to full-blown mandates. In this 
piece, we will advance four proposals that seem particularly helpful for tackling the 
challenges of the lack of transparency and the rising inequality driven by smart 
discrimination and dual valence correlations. Our proposals are (1) mandatory active 
choice between payment with money and payment with data, (2) ex post evaluation of 
privacy notices, (3) democratized data collection, and (4) wealth- or income-responsive 
fines. While other valuable proposals have been put on the table,113 we enrich and 
broaden the debate by introducing four novel categories. 
1. Toward a Real Choice Between Payment with Money and Payment with Data: 
Forcing Data Free Services 
¶28  The first option consists in mandating an active choice by consumers and users 
about whether to pay for an online service indirectly through their data or directly 
through monetary payments. This gives citizens an “exit strategy” from data collection. 
Data collection services such as Facebook create psychographic profiles on people and 
infer hidden data (such as race, sexual orientation) from preference data for advertising 
purposes. But Facebook and others have other plans on how to monetize this data in 
surprising ways. The Facebook app could be used for all sorts of other decisions, such as 
authentication, security checks, and even controlling car traffic flow.114 Beyond targeted 
advertising, therefore, some Facebook-generated data might be used in areas that could 
potentially have much greater impact on the individual and pose greater risk for 
111 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4. 
112 Supra, Part I.1. 
113 See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 22–28; VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK
171–84 (2014); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 46–59; Sara Hajian & Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Direct and 
Indirect Discrimination Prevention Methods, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 241 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013). For technical proposals based on discrimination-free 
classifications, see Calders & Verwer, supra note 37; Faisal Kamiran, Toon Calders & Mykola 
Pechenizkiy, Techniques for Discrimination-Free Predictive Models, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN 
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 223 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013). 
114 We are grateful to Chris Hoofnagle for pressing us on this point.
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discrimination. The vulnerable car buyer or the prospective non-white tenant from our 
examples in Section 1 might feel that they are more likely to be subjected to 
discrimination by Facebook and therefore decide to opt for a data-free service. 
¶29  The reason for a regulatory intervention in the market by a mandatory active choice 
regime is twofold. First, as was noted,115 the attitude-action gap in the domain of privacy 
protection by online users points to a lack of meaningful choice concerning data-
protecting alternatives to data-collecting services. Given the potential use of data in a 
wide range of areas, including those with a high potential for discrimination, such as 
housing or labor markets, increasing the offer or the salience of alternative, data-free 
services seems crucial. Moreover, even for users who are currently aware of privacy-
respecting alternatives such as the few providers offering messaging services in exchange 
for monetary instead of data compensation, the lock-in or network effect mentioned 
above will often make a switch to these alternatives unattractive.116 What is the use of 
joining a messaging service or a social network if most of my friends cannot be reached 
within it? Therefore, it seems more promising to require the big players to offer data-free 
services rather than to expect the market to self-correct. Whereas such a regulatory tool 
might endanger the business model of a small start-up that would be hesitant to introduce 
a data-free option, big companies like Facebook and Google already have a large pool of 
data due to the many users they have. Therefore, such companies can first implement our 
proposal in a pilot version. Again, the existing, vast attitude-action gap suggests that 
market-based self-correction strategies are currently not working properly. 
¶30  While proposals have already been made in the direction of considering the 
monetary effect of “free” services,117 we add to the existing literature in three distinct 
ways. First, we frame the decision between data-collecting and data free-services as an 
instantiation of “active choice,” a technique analyzed extensively in the behavioral 
scholarship. This allows us to uncover the necessary conditions for this mechanism to 
function adequately. Second, we provide a concrete estimate for the possible price range 
of the paid option compared with the data-free option, streamlining the debate on the 
monetization of “free” services and the economic value of data.118 Third, we offer an 
analysis of the crucial question of price control for the data-free option. 
115 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
116 For an account of network effects in the digital economy, see ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J.
COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995); Yifan Dou, Marius F. Niculescu & D. J. Wu, Engineering
Optimal Network Effects via Social Media Features and Seeding in Markets for Digital Goods and 
Services, 24 INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH 164 (2013); Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Network 
Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization, 40 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 85, 86–87 (1992). 
117 See, e.g., the brief discussion in Calo, supra note 7, at 1047–48, and, more substantially, Chris 
Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 606, 61–62 (2014) (explaining that “free” services actually state a price for their services 
and that their users should be treated as consumers for the purposes of consumer protection law); see also
Henk Kox, Bas Straathof & Gijsbert Zwart, Targeted advertising, platform competition and privacy, CPB 
Discussion Paper 280 (July 1, 2014), http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/targeted-advertising-platform-
competition-and-privacy.
118 See Arslan Aziz & Rahul Telang, What Is a Digital Cookie Worth? (Carnegie Mellon U. 
Working Paper, March 31, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757325 [https://perma.cc/26D9-5H9C]; 
Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 117, at 634–40, 666–67. 
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¶31  The proposal thus draws on a technique popularized by behavioral law and 
economics, i.e., active choice.119 The key idea is to force providers of so far “gratuitous” 
services to offer users a clear choice between two different contracts. Under the first 
option, users would not be required to make any monetary payments and the providers 
would be allowed to collect and process their data in return for services, as is now the 
case with Google, Facebook, Microsoft’s Hotmail, and others (the data-collecting 
option). Under the second option, users would make monetary payments (be it on a one-
off basis for each service or on a monthly basis) and providers would not be allowed to 
collect or process any of the users’ data (the data-free option).120 Every provider of online 
services would thus be required to present at least one data-free option for every service it 
publicly offers on the market. As Henk Kox, Bas Straathof, and Gijsbert Zwart have 
demonstrated, such a segmented market structure would maximize both consumer and 
total surplus, particularly if consumers have heterogeneous preferences with respect to 
privacy and tracking.121
¶32  Mandating an active choice between these two sets of options only makes sense, 
however, if it can be expected to make a difference in user choice. Recent scholarship has 
identified two key conditions that must be met in order for active choice to be effective. 
First, fairly large heterogeneity in actor preferences between the two choice options must 
be expected. The reason for this is that, if actor preferences tend to be homogenous, a 
default rule tailored toward these preferences will often be more effective and potentially 
less intrusive. However, in agreement with other scholars,122 we expect preferences of 
users to diverge heavily on the question of whether they are willing to pay with money 
instead of with data. Because the issue of data protection and privacy polarizes society 
and legal discourse as few other issues do, an assumption of uniform preferences can be 
safely rejected. The advantage of active choice is that users will be able to sort 
themselves into categories depending on their respective preferences. 
¶33  Second, users should be expected to be in a position to make a meaningful choice 
between the two options. More specifically, they should be better able to make that 
choice than a regulator crafting a default rule or a substantial mandatory provision. For 
this condition to be fulfilled, it seems clear that additional information needs to be given 
to consumers to demonstrate what is at stake in the choice between the data-collection 
and the data-free option. At the moment, many users seem to be unaware of the fact that 
they are indirectly paying for “gratuitous” services with their data. The most salient way 
to enable a comparison between the two options would therefore be to attach a monetary 
119 Cass R., Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1173 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1349, 1400 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1 (2014). 
120 Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 117, at 669–70, note that such a contract does not 
guarantee that data is not collected illegally; however, they also observe that it can mark the transition from 
a “free” to a “paid” service space, in which, we suggest, the collection practices of the paid part should be 
supervised closely to minimize illegal conduct. In this domain, the suggestion for the establishment of an 
independent supervisory authority is worthwhile. See Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 67 ADMIN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2747994 [https://perma.cc/Z55N-E6ME]. 
121 Kox, Straathof & Zwart, supra note 117, at 5 (modeling significant positive externalities from 
low privacy to high privacy-sensitive consumers in a competitive framework). 
122 Id. at 7. 
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price tag on both. While this is simple to calculate for the data-free option, where a 
monetary payment has to be made anyway, it is more difficult to estimate the value given 
away by the consent to collect and process user data. Nevertheless, the salience of the 
monetary consequences of choice seems crucial: in other areas of consumer choice, 
empirical studies suggest that the most effective notices are those highlighting the 
monetary consequences for consumers.123
¶34  What could be a good proxy for the value of user data? We use two estimation 
strategies, a bottom-up and a top-down one, and test the results against the results of a 
recent study.124 First, an average lower threshold for the value of user data can be 
constructed by comparing the prices providers can charge for personalized and for non-
personalized advertising, respectively (bottom-up approach). According to industry 
sources, companies can charge roughly 10 times more for personalized advertising 
(retargeting) vis-à-vis standard advertising. According to the same sources, 1000 
personalized advertisements on Facebook mobile would cost approximately 50 cents, and 
about twice that amount for the desktop version of Facebook. Thus, each personalized 
advertisement costs between 0.1 and 0.05 cents. Let us further assume that the average 
user sees 100 advertisements per day (a generous estimate). The revenue from 
personalized advertising for a single average customer thus lies between 5 and 10 cents 
per day, or between $1.50 and $3 per month. In a conservative estimate, we can therefore 
say that the difference between personalized and non-personalized advertising in the case 
of Facebook for a single average customer amounts to roughly $2.70. We have to add to 
this the indirect revenue that Facebook and other companies generate through 
personalizing advertisements on websites of third parties by using Facebook’s or other 
companies’ own data. This “audience network” is a growing source of revenue in the 
industry. Average revenue from third-party websites is very difficult to ascertain, but a 
total spread between personalized and non-personalized advertising of roughly $4 per 
month should be a good estimate. For an average user, this sum represents an estimate of 
the total marginal value of permitting versus not permitting the collection of user data. At 
the same time, it offers a glimpse of where a competitive price for a data-free service 
might stand. While some degree of uncertainty remains, it seems highly plausible to 
assume that at least the dimension (ranging $1 to $10) is correct. 
¶35  This finding is corroborated by an estimate using a different calculation strategy: 
comparing the total revenue of Facebook with the total number of users (top-down 
approach). For the fiscal year of 2015, total revenue stands at $17.93 billion per year,125
the most significant part of this being revenue from advertising. As of the last quarter of 
123 Richard G. Newell & Juha Siikamäki, Nudging Energy Efficiency Behavior: The Role of 
Information Labels, 1 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECONOMISTS 555, 593 (2014); Cristiano Codagnone, 




124 Aziz & Telang, supra note 118. 
125 Annual Financials for Facebook Inc., MARKETWATCH,
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/fb/financials [https://perma.cc/CQ5B-F59H]. 
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2015, the total number of users was 1.59 billion.126 Thus, Facebook generates an average 
of about ten dollars of revenue from advertising per user per year, or about one dollar per 
month. Between the two results of the bottom-up ($4 per month) and the top-down 
approach ($1 per month), we choose the one with a higher estimate since data collected 
today most likely will have a significant number of uses in the future which we could not 
take account of in our estimates. 
¶36  This result is further strengthened by the results of a recent empirical study.127 The 
authors have used a large dataset of individual bid-level data points from real-time 
retargeting auctions to empirically determine the effectiveness of personalized 
advertisements (or, in the jargon of the industry, “retargeting”).128 They found that more 
personalization generates better predictions concerning the user’s value—i.e., it is 
instrumental in estimating their purchase probability, but at a diminishing rate.129 In this 
way, it also makes advertisements more effective, since advertisements tend to exhibit 
greater influence on purchasers who have a higher probability of buying in the first 
place.130 These, in turn, can be identified with the aid of data technologies such as digital 
cookies. Finally, Aziz and Telang calculate a dollar amount of the marginal value of 
personalized ads: $1.7 billion per quarter in the U.S. across the entire economy.131 In 
2015, 205 million US citizens qualified as online shoppers.132  This corresponds to a 
marginal value of roughly $2.8 per U.S. online shopper per month for personalized 
ads.133 This number covers all e-commerce, not only one company. However, since 
Facebook is one of the largest users of cookies and personalized ads,134 we can estimate 
that a large fraction of this number corresponds to the marginal value for Facebook. Thus, 
again, the prize for the data-free option lies within our estimated range of $1-10 per 
month.
 Both options, the data-collecting and the data-free, would therefore have to 
feature a prominent, salient notice, which could read, for the former: 
126 Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter 2016, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
[https://perma.cc/48T5-XXHL].
127 Aziz & Telang, supra note 118. 
128 Retargeting is the practice of targeting consumers who have already been in contact with a 
company or a product. See Aziz & Telang, supra note 118, at 4. 
129 Id. at 9. 
130 Id. at 24–25. 
131 Id. at 30; in fact, this is the marginal value resulting from allowing most conventional tracking 
vis-à-vis only allowing the tracking of the type of browser a user uses. 
132 Number of Digital Shoppers in the United States from 2014 to 2019, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/183755/number-of-us-internet-shoppers-since-2009/
[https://perma.cc/GY35-NHYC]
133 The actual amount is likely to be higher since Aziz and Telang’s baseline is minimum 
targeting, not zero targeting. See supra note 118. 
134 Cf. Brandon Workman & Emily Adler, Facebook Is Emerging As A Huge Engine For Driving 
E-Commerce Traffic And Purchases, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-
facebook-drive-e-commerce-sales-2014-10?IR=T [https://perma.cc/532J-86R2]; Mark Macdonald, Which 
Social Media Platforms Drive the Most Sales? SHOPIFY BLOGS (Mar. 10, 2014) 
https://www.shopify.com/blog/12731545-which-social-media-platforms-drive-the-most-sales-infographic
[https://perma.cc/F2HH-XXT6]. 
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“For this option, you pay with your data. An average user gives away monthly 
data worth about $4.”
For the data-free option, the notice could read:
“For this option, you pay with your money instead of your data. The monthly 
price is $[x].” 
The two major agencies involved in enforcing privacy policies, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), could develop 
concrete guidelines for the framing of the notice. At least from a normative vantage point, 
the rules should also be constitutional, even in the light of the compelled commercial 
speech doctrine of the Supreme Court.135
¶37  A final problem with this proposal, however, is that its effectiveness crucially 
depends on the price companies would charge for the data-free service. What would 
prevent companies who would like to thwart efforts to change their business model from 
charging prohibitive prices for the data-free option, such as $100 for a month of 
Facebook’s use?136 Such strategies would particularly make data-free services 
unavailable for low-income people, adding to economic inequality. Since many data-
services generate considerable network (lock-in) effects, it would not be enough to 
simply rely on competition to drive down prices.137 Any efforts to constrain the freedom 
of a company to charge what it deems to be a competitive price for the data-free option, 
however, enter the treacherous terrain of price control by the state. Arguably, the most 
one could hope for is the enforcement of a provision stating that the price of the data-free 
service must be reasonable in comparison with some benchmark. Antitrust law provides 
some examples of how such a strategy could be given meaning. A classical problem of 
antitrust under § 2 of the Sherman Act is predatory pricing, i.e., pricing a good below 
marginal cost in order to hurt competitors.138 In order to determine whether predatory 
pricing occurs, one strategy is to compare prices with actual marginal cost. While 
predatory pricing occurs when the prices are below marginal cost, conscious deterrence 
of users from the data-free option would require pricing significantly above marginal 
cost. Thus, the feasibility of enforcement hinges on the approximate determination of 
actual marginal cost. As antitrust scholars Areeda and Turner have suggested, average 
variable cost139 can be used as a proxy for marginal cost.140 Data on the former is usually 
135 See Christine Jolls, Debiasing Through Law and the First Amendment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1411
(2015); cf. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1035–40 (2014). 
136 Cf. Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 117, at 662. 
137 Cf. Pasquale, supra note 2, at 141; see also supra note 116and accompanying text. 
138 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 702 (1975); Nicola Giocoli, When Low Is No Good: Predatory 
Pricing and U.S. Antitrust Law (1950–1980), 18 EUR. J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 777, 780–83 (2011). 
139 For a useful definition of average variable cost, see Areeda & Turner, supra note 138, at 700
(“Variable costs, as the name implies, are costs that vary with 
changes in output. They typically include such items as materials, 
fuel, labor directly used to produce the product, indirect labor 
such as foremen, clerks, and custodial help, utilities, repair and 
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much more readily available than for the latter.141 The test is thus widely used, with some 
variations, by courts both in the U.S. and in the European Union.142 We therefore suggest 
an “inverse predatory pricing approach” using the average variable cost test in order to 
determine whether the actual price charged is reasonable. 
¶38  Moreover, there is a second proxy that can be used to determine the reasonableness 
of the price of the data-free option: the marginal value of data given away in the data-
collection option. The direct payment in the data-free option is introduced precisely to 
make up for losses generated by the impossibility of marketing data under this contract. 
Therefore, the marginal value of personalized data, as calculated above, can provide a 
benchmark for measuring whether prices are too high. 
¶39  The final problem is that the number of people using the data-free service might 
dynamically affect the marginal value. Generally, if, as a consequence of the active 
choice regime, the total amount of user data available to the provider shrinks, then the 
amount of training data and the predictive quality of algorithms will be reduced. Less 
predictive power, however, means less marginal value. The opt-out of data-sensitive 
users therefore can be expected to have spillover effects on the value of the data of those 
users that will retain the data-collecting option. However, this does not disqualify our 
proposal: if the data-free option is chosen only by a minority of users, it won’t affect the 
marginal value of the remaining users’ data by much. If it is chosen more often, and the 
marginal value is negatively impacted, the company is always free to demonstrate that the 
marginal value has decreased, and to adapt the notice and pricing accordingly.143
Furthermore, our proposal can be tested in a pilot phase. 
¶40  To conclude, the price should be deemed unreasonable if it is more than 1.5 times 
of either average variable cost or the marginal value of personalized data. The 
enforcement of such a reasonableness requirement could be left to antitrust authorities 
such as the FTC, which have considerable experience with predatory pricing. It would 
provide the necessary bite for a mandatory data-free option to be implemented within a 
scheme of active choice. 
¶41  The advantages of a scheme of active choice are clear. First, it enhances 
transparency by saliently uncovering that users are indirectly paying for “free” services 
with their personal data. Second, it remedies another key flaw inherent in the current 
disclosure mechanism: the lack of meaningful choice. Many services today are offered on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis. For services offered by dominant companies such as Facebook 
or Google, often there is no meaningful, equally satisfying alternative. Due to network 
lock-in effects, even for users who would prefer not to share their data but remain on 
maintenance, and per unit royalties and license fees. The average 
variable cost is the sum of all variable costs divided by output.”). 
140 Id. at 716–18, 733; see also William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average 
Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. & ECON. 49, 49 (1996). 
141 Areeda & Turner, supra note 138, at 716; Giocoli, supra note 132, at 795–96. 
142 See Baumol, supra note 140, at 49; Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1701 (2013); Aaron Edlin, Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012). 
143 If it becomes apparent that the marginal value drops to an extent that a data-free service cannot 
be profitably maintained at a price of less than 150% of the marginal value, the cap could be exceptionally 
raised by the supervisory authority, e.g. to 180%. This would not hurt users much since the absolute price, 
after a drop in the marginal value, would stay approximately the same.  
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Facebook, there is no available alternative. Mandating an active choice, and thus 
mandating a data-free service, puts the user back in control over whether she wants to 
share data with the company in the first place. Third, we would like to note that 
companies may have an intrinsic interest in implementing such an active choice regime 
as well – to the extent that they wish to continue to provide their services in the EU. The 
new E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)144 limits the extent to which 
personal data may be collected and processed for purposes outside of the strict scope of 
the contract concluded between a data-collecting company and a user: for the assessment 
of the validity of consent, “utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the 
performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent 
to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that 
contract” (Art. 7(4) GDPR). Whenever a real choice between the two types of services 
contemplated in our proposal is offered, however, the performance of a contract is never 
conditional on the processing of personal data – users may always choose the data-free 
option to contract for the same services. Hence, our proposal offers companies a 
straightforward way to comply with EU regulations – a crucial prerogative given the 
steep penalties now provided for breaches of EU data protection law (see Art. 83 
GDPR).145
¶42  In this section, we have argued that to the extent that data is shared less the 
technique of active choice reduces the potential for discrimination for the most vulnerable 
groups. It is particularly noteworthy that users who fear potential discrimination could 
choose  data-free option. Since discrimination can take place along a range of different 
characteristics, ranging from sexual orientation to racial or social background to political 
affiliations, it is also unlikely that the choice of the data-free option will become a signal 
of belonging to any specific minority group (which in turn could invite discrimination 
against the users of  data-free service). Rather, it is to be expected that the option will be 
selected for a wide variety of motives, from fear of discrimination by potentially 
vulnerable individuals all the way to the conscious refusal of some consumers to share 
their personal data as a matter of principle. These are legitimate motives worthy of being 
supported by legal means. Price control by an inverse predatory pricing strategy, as 
suggested here, ensures that even low-income users get access to data-free services, thus 
incrementally contributing to mitigating economic inequality. Finally, we have shown 
that introducing a data-free (paid by money) option by services powered by Big Data is 
unlikely to endanger the business model of major market players that can adjust pricing 
according to the marginal value. 
2. Unconscionability and Ex Post Evaluation 
¶43  An active choice between a data-collecting and a data-free option will only get us 
so far, however. It seems reasonable to expect that at least some less-educated users 
would stick with the data-collecting option and would thus remain vulnerable to 
144 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), EU OJ 2016 L 119/1. 
145 See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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discriminatory uses of their data. Since disclosure has proven unavailing in recent years, 
we suggest resorting to a more intrusive but potentially more effective remedy: ex post 
evaluation of the contractual validity146 of privacy provisions, both by supervisory 
authorities and courts. 
¶44  It is well known, however, that in the U.S. a regime of scrutiny of unfair 
contractual terms by the courts is virtually nonexistent.147 The closest analogy can be 
found in the doctrine of unconscionability, particularly as applied by the California 
courts.148 We are therefore the first to propose an analysis of how far this doctrine can be 
fruitfully applied to the ex post evaluation of the validity of privacy standards dictated by 
data processing companies. 
¶45  The unconscionability doctrine generally requires the fulfillment of two elements, 
one procedural and one substantive. Both are necessary, but a deficiency in one can be 
balanced in an overall assessment by a greater weight of the other prong.149 Case law has 
established that procedural unconscionability requires the absence of meaningful choice 
for one party to the contract.150 This definition is corroborated by comment d to § 208 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Procedural unconscionability further presents 
when there is either oppression or surprise,151 a dichotomy also highlighted by comment 
1 to § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Oppression is found 
paradigmatically when there is an inequality of bargaining power, which results in the 
absence of negotiation and meaningful choice. More often than not, take-it-or-leave-it 
offers have met the “oppression” prong of the unconscionability standard.152 In turn, 
surprise is evoked when a clause is hidden in the “prolix printed form.”153 The surprise 
element also leads to unenforceability under § 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. In the realm of privacy and data protection, however, it will be difficult to find 
surprise given the widespread use of data collection, sharing, and processing clauses. 
Therefore, if procedural unconscionability is to have a bearing on data privacy 
provisions, it must be through the oppression element. 
¶46  There are two distinct problems with finding procedural unconscionability in 
privacy provisions. First, a broad interpretation of oppression is not shared by all 
jurisdictions.154 Therefore, a solution based on these principles would apply at most to 
146 For a taxonomy of algorithmic contracts, see Lauren H. Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, STAN.
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
147 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1159 
(1976); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204, 1255 (2003). 
148 IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 548–49 (8th ed. 2012). For an 
analysis of California’s frontrunner role and future potential on other areas of privacy law and policy 
development in the U.S., see Bilyana Petkova, The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism, 20 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 595 (2016).
149 Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000); 
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002). 
150 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
151 Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 783.
152 Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 138, 145–46 (Ct. App. 1997); Ferguson, 298 F.3d 
778; see also Williams, 350 F. 2d 445 (holding that gross inequality of bargaining power can lead to lack of 
meaningful choice).  
153 Id.
154 Cf. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 148, at 547–49. 
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residents of California, leaving large parts of the U.S. out of the picture. Second, as soon 
as the scheme of active choice described in the previous section is implemented, it will be 
impossible to argue that there is no meaningful choice for consumers. Therefore, 
unconscionability will be unhelpful for those consumers who choose the data-collecting 
option under the active choice regime. Nevertheless, it may still play a prominent role as 
long as there is no law enacting such a scheme. 
¶47  Under current circumstances, it may thus be persuasively argued that there is 
indeed an inequality of bargaining power between data processing companies and 
individual users. Negotiation is totally absent from the bargaining process, and take-it-or-
leave-it offers are drafted by dominant firms such as Facebook or Google. These 
contracts leave no reasonable alternatives for potential users. It should be noted that, at 
least in California, the option to conclude a contract with another party on more favorable 
terms does not hinder the finding of procedural unconscionability.155 Therefore, under the 
Ferguson standard,156 oppression and, hence, procedural unconscionability may be found 
in the current practice of contractual privacy provisions. 
¶48  The substantive prong is generally deemed fulfilled under Ferguson when the terms 
of the agreement are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.157 Other formulations 
suggest it to be sufficient that the terms are unreasonably favorable to one party.158
Reasonable people will disagree on what terms exactly qualify for substantive 
unconscionability under either standard. However, it seems plausible to assume that 
particularly egregious and profit-making forms of data sharing and processing confer a 
sufficiently unilateral advantage to data- processing companies. Examples include data 
shared unrestrictedly with third parties, data used to personalize advertisements not only 
within the scope of the actual service offered by the company but also on external 
websites, and the generation of massive profits from this data without users monetarily 
sharing in them.159
¶49  All in all, there is reason to believe that the application of the California doctrine of 
unconscionability presents a way forward for invalidating the most egregious provisions 
of data sharing and processing. However, it falls short of providing a solution for the 
entire U.S. because of its restricted geographical scope and its incompatibility with the 
scheme of active choice advocated in the previous section. The gold standard would 
certainly be to include a clause outlawing inappropriate data collection, sharing, and 
processing in federal and state data protection laws. Such a general clause could be 
enforced publicly by the FTC and simultaneously privately through actions in civil 
courts, as is the case with existing unfair trade provisions or securities regulation. 
Another option would be to attach an extraterritorial element to the doctrine, much like 
existing legislation, such as the California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) 
does for other areas of privacy concern. Finally, the current effort of the American Law 
155 Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002). 
156 See Ferguson, 298 F.3d 778. In Ferguson, the Court held that oppression can be deduced from 
an inequality of bargaining power which results in absence of negotiation and meaningful choice, thus 
making the prong applicable to take-it-or-leave-it contracts, or contracts of adhesion. 
157 Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 1999); Ferguson,
298 F.3d 778. 
158 Williams, 350 F.2d 445.
159 See infra notes 196-194 for a more detailed treatment of the unconscionability of such terms. 
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Institute (ALI) to draft a new Restatement of Consumer Contracts might present another 
opportunity to (re)introduce unconscionability into U.S. law.160
3. Democratizing Data Collection and Processing 
¶50  Reconciling data collection with democratic principles and putting control over 
personal data back into the hands of those being tracked can be seen as a key political and 
legal challenge in the age of Big Data. The problems associated with policing code for 
the general public may be overcome in the long run, but they point to the need for further 
ideas about democratizing data processing and collection in the meantime. 
¶51  Our first proposal consists in forcing (large) companies to routinely conduct 
representative surveys among current and potential users to determine whether users 
would prefer less collection and processing of their data, as well as to see the extent to 
which users actually understand the bargain offered by the company. Such a requirement 
would go well beyond the mere exhortation to develop codes of conduct, widespread in 
other areas of privacy law in the U.S. and envisioned in the E.U. General Data Protection 
Regulation.161 The surveys, while triggering only moderate immediate consequences, 
would enable users, including those who are potentially more vulnerable to 
discrimination, to regain an institutionalized voice. While an obligation to comply with 
the findings would probably constitute too deep an intrusion into the freedom to conduct 
business, companies could be required to publicly and saliently disclose the results of 
their survey. Thus, future business policies of the company could be measured against the 
results of the survey to ascertain whether companies voluntarily comply with the 
suggestions of their users. It can be expected that the results of the survey would exert at 
least a moderate disciplining influence on companies’ data policies. Repeated 
noncompliance with the suggestions of the survey could be highlighted by activists or 
potentially even punished by investors. 
¶52  The other option is also institutional in nature and consists of the obligatory 
installation of a data protection compliance officer in each company to be elected partly 
by current users; the officer ought to report directly to the CEO of a company. The 
voluntary spread of the institution of the data protection officer has been generally 
welcomed in other areas of privacy concern and is said to have exercised a transformative 
influence on the generation of a culture of compliance across the U.S. corporate sector.162
Such a position, albeit less strictly defined, is now also envisaged in the new E.U. 
General Data Protection Regulation.163
160 For ALI’s timeframe, see https://www.ali.org/projects/show/consumer-contracts/
[http://perma.cc/96ZQ-FW3L]. 
161 Art. 40 of Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J., 
(L 119) 1. See also Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 J.L. & POL’Y
INFO. SOC’Y 356, 357 (2011).
162 KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 76–81 (2015).
163 Art. 37 of Regulation 2016/679, supra note 161. 
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¶53  How could the election of such an officer by current users be operationalized? We 
suggest that votes are split equally between the board of directors and users. Thus, the 
totality of the votes of board members is weighted so as to correspond to the weight of 
half of all votes cast. The remaining half comes from users if the user turnout surpasses a 
certain threshold of, e.g., 20%. This strategy ensures that a minority of activist users is 
not driving up the result of the election. However, if users do not care to read privacy 
notices,164 can they be expected to cast votes for such a position at all? On the one hand, 
if they do not participate in sufficient numbers, the board will appoint the officer as the 
user vote is discounted to zero. On the other hand, making the issue of data use and 
collection salient and explaining that users have a chance to shape the policy and 
structure of the company should help instill significant incentives to vote. After all, the 
strategies we propose here such as the publication of user surveys and mandated active 
choice regime can all work in conjunction to increase the salience of the issue of data 
collection and use by companies. The election of a data compliance officer pairs this 
heightened awareness with a real, institutionalized voice for consumers. 
4. Wealth- or Income-Responsive Files 
¶54 Our first three suggestions were all geared toward restraining the practices of Big 
Data companies. Finally, we come back to our proposal to actively combat economic and 
legal inequality through Big Data. In Section I we discussed not only the negative 
externalities triggered by uses of Big Data but also hinted to its potential for promoting 
equality. In particular, we gave the example of positive price discrimination based on 
wealth indicators by private companies such as Amazon or Orbitz.165 However, positive 
price discrimination can only be a very incomplete contribution to the mitigation of 
economic inequality since the resulting distributional effect would channel wealth from 
buyers to sellers, but in all likelihood it would not reach out to the most economically 
disadvantaged layers of society. To rein in the potential of Big Data, we thus suggest a 
strategy of data-driven fines for both individuals and companies. 
¶55  The most direct way of tackling inequality by means of Big Data is to couple 
administrative and criminal fines with wealth or income in a progressive way, similar to 
progressive income tax schemes. Such a system of what may be termed “economic 
affirmative action” would not necessarily run afoul of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because “wealth” is not a protected class within its ambit;166
rather, as we argued in Part I, it would reinforce equality before the law. The question of 
whether criminal and administrative fines should depend on the income and wealth of the 
person fined is not entirely new. In fact, Jeremy Bentham proposed the utility-
responsiveness of fines as far back as 1789.167 In many European countries, criminal 
fines (day fines) already depend on the income of the offender, but this is not the case in 
164 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine 
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013). 
165 Supra, note 71 and accompanying text. 
166 See, e.g., OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., & JOHN M. SCHEB II, 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480
(14th ed., 2008). 
167 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, chs. 
XII-XV (1789). 
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the U.K. and the U.S. (except for rare experiments with day fines in some communities in 
the U.S.).168 Finland has recently introduced income-responsive administrative fines, and 
Switzerland has enacted income- and wealth-responsive administrative fines, for example 
for traffic tickets.169 The rising levels of economic inequality make the debate all the 
more pressing today. The question of the justification of wealth- or income-responsive 
fines hinges on the legitimizing reasons for the existence of fines in the first place. If 
fines are regarded merely as tools to enforce corrective or retributive justice,170 it may be 
argued that they should be exactly the same for everybody independent of their social or 
economic status. However, in recent decades, administrative and criminal sanctions have 
increasingly been considered to be part of the toolbox of the regulator for steering 
behavior.171 This is not to deny that particularly criminal sanctions also have a strong 
moral and corrective or retributive justice underpinning and that both administrative and 
criminal fines form part of the expressive function of the law;172 in fact, our proposal 
explicitly acknowledges this dimension through the introduction of a “base fine.”173
Nevertheless, the steering component has been identified as one of the key functions of 
these two types of state action.174
¶56  If this is true, then the effectiveness of a fine in deterring certain kinds of behavior, 
such as traffic speeding, will crucially depend on the marginal utility of wealth or 
income. In economics, the decreasing marginal utility of both wealth and income is 
almost universally accepted.175 This implies that a speeding ticket over $50 will be less of 
a disutility for a millionaire than for a welfare recipient. Therefore, it can be expected to 
exert less of a behavioral influence on high earning or on high net wealth individuals than 
others. Note that both high income and high net worth reduces the marginal utility of 
money: this provides a strong reason to correct the amount of fines both for income and 
for wealth. This in turn is crucial for an assessment of income- or wealth-dependent fines 
from the perspective of equality before the law.176 While it seems clear that greater fines 
168 Lance R. Hignite & Mark Kellar, Day Fines, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (January 22, 2014); Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay 
More?, 11 REV. L. & ECON. 481, 484–85 (2015). 
169 Suzanne Daley, Speeding in Finland Can Cost a Fortune, If You Already Have One, N.Y.
TIMES (April 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/world/europe/speeding-in-finland-can-cost-a-
fortune-if-you-already-have-one.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/232M-P3MJ]; Christian Demuth, Raser büßt 
Tempoverstoß in der Schweiz mit 200.000 Euro, STRAFFRE-MOBIL.DE, http://www.straffrei-
mobil.de/ausland/bussgelder/565-raser-buesst-tempoverstoss-in-der-schweiz-mit-200000-euro
[https://perma.cc/SAD4-MMZV]. 
170 See, e.g., the overview in Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1811–12 (1997). 
171 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL.
ECON. 385 (1993); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 473 (2004). 
172 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
173 See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra, note 171. 
175 R.D. Collison Black, Utility, in 8 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 577 (2d ed., 
Steven N. Durlauf & Steven E. Blume eds., 2008); HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 51-52 (8th ed., 2010). The principle was already used by the 19th century 
marginalists. See Richard S. Howey, The Origins of Marginalism, 4 HIST. POL. ECON. 281, 283 (1972). 
176 For a general account of the interaction between personalized law and equality, see Hacker,
supra note 21. 
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for high income or high net worth individuals lower economic inequality, they remain 
contested under a standard of equality that holds that all citizens should be treated alike 
before the law. However, as was mentioned earlier, the principle of equality not only 
requires treating sufficiently similar things similarly, but also treating sufficiently 
different things differently. If the raison d’être of criminal and administrative fines is to 
steer behavior ex ante, it seems persuasive to argue that individual differences in the 
responsiveness to fines should require different amounts of fines in the light of equal 
protection before the law. The economic responsiveness to fines therefore becomes a 
crucial distinguishing characteristic that significantly differentiates similar offenses, such 
as speeding, by different offenders. Income- and wealth-dependent fines therefore foster 
not only economic but also legal equality.177
¶57  In fact, income-responsiveness is already a landmark of administrative enforcement 
against companies when fines are calculated as a fraction of total annual revenue. While 
antitrust cases have attracted most attention,178 it is precisely the field of data protection 
that is bound to become the successor to antitrust in terms of administrative fines. 
According to the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) recently voted by the 
European Parliament, a violation of its provisions can lead to administrative fines in the 
amount of up to 4% of annual worldwide turnover for undertakings.179 The original 
proposal of the European Commission used the language of “proportionate and 
dissuasive” sanctions,180 a formula which is preserved in the final version of the 
Regulation.181 Thus, from 2018 when the GDPR will go into force, both national courts 
and the data protection authorities of the European Member States— their enforcement 
administrative bodies—will be able to set in place “a system which provides for effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties.”182 This is a major change after the meager fines 
levied on Facebook, e.g., for violation of privacy legislation in the past.183
¶58  We inquire into how Big Data can help in operationalizing the indexing of fines to 
wealth and income. For example, one of the key problems in adjusting fines to income in 
the countries in which it is practiced is to determine exactly the relevant amount of 
income. In Germany, for example, the judge would simply ask the defendant what her 
monthly income is and perform a plausibility check. However, this often leads to a vast 
177 Cf. also Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, supra note 168 (arguing that income-responsive day fines 
contribute to greater equality of treatment in sanctioning criminal behavior). 
178 See, e.g., John M. Connor, Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International 
Cartels, 6 J. IND. COMPET. & TRADE 195 (2006). 
179 Art. 83(5) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
180 Recital 119 and Art. 79(2) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final. 
181 See Recitals 151 and 152 and Art. 83(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
EU OJ 2016 L 119/1. 
182 Art. 83(4) read in conjunction with para. 152 of the Preamble, id.
183 See PASQUALE, supra note 2, at 145. While this type of income-based weighting presents a 
welcome first step, it should be coupled with wealth-responsive weighting based on a metric of the total 
value of the company. This seems even easier to implement than in the case of individual actors: for public 
companies, the data is freely available in the form of quarterly and annual earnings reports; for nonpublic 
companies, information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has to be used. 
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understatement of income by criminal offenders in an effort to lower their fines. Data 
technologies can be used to automatically, i.e., algorithmically, couple the amount of 
fines with the earnings and wealth data available to different agencies, for example, to the 
I.R.S. Simultaneously, robust encryption techniques must be used in order to prevent 
sensitive data, such as earnings statements of companies or individuals, from becoming 
public. The mere transfer of data from the I.R.S. to the administrative or criminal 
authorities itself does not necessitate the use of Big Data. However, a major problem lies 
in the validity of the data received by the I.R.S. As is well-known and highlighted by, 
inter alia, the Panama Papers, tax evasion costs the state billions of dollars every year, 
pointing to a significant degree of error in the data sets available to tax authorities. Big 
Data could now potentially be used to provide a better estimate of the real income and 
wealth of taxed subjects. While the technologies are probably not precise enough at the 
moment to constitute a firm enough basis to evaluate actual tax calculations on the 
results, a significant divergence between stated income and/or wealth on the one hand 
and Big Data-driven estimates of real income and/or wealth could trigger heightened 
scrutiny by the tax authorities. In fact, the Belgian and Dutch tax authorities are already 
using data mining to single out such “irregular” cases in order to combat tax fraud.184
Furthermore, some companies such as Kreditech185 are already leveraging the data 
mining power of algorithms to calculate the risk profiles of potential lenders.186 These are 
used to inform loan decisions. One key parameter for every loan decision is, obviously, 
the individual’s wealth and income. The emergence of Big Data lending techniques 
therefore testifies to the potential of data mining for estimating wealth and income 
levels.187 In sum, if the legal and practical difficulties of interagency sharing of 
184 KPMG, Big data and tax: what is the link? (2016), 
http://smartalwayswins.kpmg.be/corporate/technology/big-data-and-tax [https://perma.cc/2736-SRHA]; 
PWC, Belgian Minister of Finance Sheds Light on Implementation of BEPS-Related Measures, TAX
INSIGHTS 2 (December 21, 2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/newsletters/tax-controversy-dispute-
resolution/assets/belgium-mof-sheds-light-on-beps-implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6LW-NLGT]. 
185 Kreditech, What We Do, https://www.kreditech.com/what-we-do/ [https://perma.cc/CCR8-
6CHY]. 
186 For a critique of traditional and Big Data credit scoring techniques, such as the FICO score, see 
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 8–16. 
187 The preceding discussion also provides the key to the practical question about which fines 
should be responsive to differences in income and wealth. If both essentially serve the same function, i.e., 
to steer behavior ex ante, both criminal and administrative fines should depend on the level of income and 
wealth of the perpetrator; in fact, even tort damages should be modified in this way since they equally serve 
a deterrent function. How can an adjustment of fines to wealth and income levels be technically achieved? 
Our proposal would be to calculate a weighting factor f for fines, which takes into account both the 
deviation from average income and average wealth. More specifically, the f factor could represent the 
arithmetic mean of two ratios: first, the ratio of the income of the offender to average (median) income; 
second the ratio of the wealth of the offender to average (median) wealth. (The formula for the fine Fo of 
offender o would then be: Fo = f f = [(io/im) + (wo/wm)/2] f, with f representing the base fine, io and im o’s 
and the median income of the population respectively, and wo and wm o’s and the median wealth of the 
population respectively. The use of the median instead of the mean affords the advantage of the median 
being less affected by very low or high outliers; it is thus less distorted by existing patterns of inequality.) 
The base fine would then be multiplied by the f factor to calculate the adjusted fine for the individual 
offender. The base fine would be the amount charged today in systems, which do not practice any wealth or 
income modifications; it thus represents the generic justice dimension of the fine. However, the base fine 
should constitute a minimum threshold for the weighted fine. Otherwise, agents whose f factor is much 
smaller than 1 (very poor and/or very low-income people) would be able to engage in sanctioned behavior 
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information can be overcome, Big Data can help the automatic adjustment of fines to the 
income and wealth of addressees, something bound to make a major contribution both to 
economic and legal equality. 
III. TEST CASES
¶59  The regulatory tools we highlight serve both to raise awareness for privacy 
concerns connected to Big Data uses and to mitigate economic and legal inequality in a 
variety of market settings. The latter objective may be achieved directly (wealth-or 
income-responsive fines) or indirectly by limiting the amount of data available to 
companies and by reinforcing the control of users over their data (not only via active 
choice but also through democratizing data collection and processing, and mobilizing the 
ex post evaluation of contracts through the unconscionability approach). We test these 
proposals by hypothetically applying them to three scenarios: social media, student 
education software, and markets for credit cards and cell phones. The choice of our case 
studies reflects areas of increased societal concern. In all cases, we show how substantial 
regulation going beyond transparency can make a difference. 
A. Social Media 
¶60  A first test case that has already surfaced a number of times in the preceding 
analysis consists of social media services such as Facebook or Google+. While such 
platforms enable unprecedented forms of communication between diffuse and locally 
remote agents, their creators have also turned them into gigantic data collection engines. 
The impact of personalization achieved by both companies has been noted both in the 
sector of personalized advertising and as a political phenomenon such as the so-called 
“filter bubbles.” 188 Moreover, recent studies have shown that Big Data analysis of user 
behavior on Facebook is strongly predictive of personality traits.189 In fact, such analysis 
allows for more fine-grained and more accurate sorting of users into the classical 
categories of personality psychology (the “Big Five”190) than traditional psychological 
at close to zero cost, which would not only reduce the deterrence effect in an unacceptable manner but also 
contradict the retributive justice dimension inherent in the base fine. To sum up, everyone pays at least the 
base fine; those for whom the f factor is larger than 1 pay a modified, higher fine to account for their 
greater wealth and/or income. 
188 See, e.g., Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Should We Worry About Filter Bubbles?, 5(1) 
INTERNET POL’Y REV 1 (2016). Filter bubbles refer to the phenomenon of users’ being confronted mainly 
with opinions and content which match their pre-existing views, thus driving out dissent and variety in 
opinion formation.
189 Jacopo Staiano et al., Friends don’t Lie – Inferring Personality Traits from Social Network 
Structure, PROC. OF THE 2012 ACM CONF. ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2012), Sept. 5-8, 2013, Pittsburgh, 
PA, USA, ACM, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2370216.2370266; Mitja D. Back et al., Facebook Profiles 
Reflect Actual Personality, Not Self-Idealization, 21 PSYCH. SCI. 372 (2010). 
190 The locus classicus is Ernest C. Tupes & Raymond E. Christal, Recurrent Personality Factors 
Based on Trait Ratings (USAF Tech. Rep. ASD-TR-61-97), Personnel Laboratory, Lackland Air Force 
Base, TX, 1961. For a good overview, see Robert R. McCrae & Oliverd P. John, An introduction to the 
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tests do.191 This is particularly worrisome as such analyses may unlock information that is 
not only personally but also medically sensitive, and that may be used to discriminate 
against certain psychological types. Thus, while Big Data can have negative externalities 
for consumers more generally, such negative externalities multiply for vulnerable groups 
that might or, in certain case, might not be even users of social media networks. Cyber 
bulling is despicable for all of its victims, but for example revenge pornography can have 
especially dire consequences for the employment and other basic life opportunities of 
those affected (overwhelmingly women).192
 The regulatory strategies we propose can be expected to at least mitigate these 
risks. Mandating active choice between a data-free and a data-collection option can be 
economically viable if inverse predatory pricing oversight of the data-free option is 
introduced.193 Furthermore, as has been noted, enabling an optimally informed choice on 
the options is crucial. Therefore, when it comes to social media, the notice should not 
only point to the value of personal data disclosed in the data-collection alternative but 
also remind users of the far-reaching consequences that access to their data can have. A 
full notice prompting active choice for Facebook users may therefore be designed as 
follows:
Your Choice!
You may now choose between two different options to sign up for Facebook: 
Data Collection Option Data Free Option 
For this option, you pay with your 
data. An average user gives away 
monthly data worth about $4.
For this option, you pay with your 
money instead of your data. The 
monthly price is $[x].
The collected data enables the
construction of your entire 
psychological profile. Each time you 
log on, imagine you start a new session 
with a company psychiatrist. 
This option does not allow for the 
construction of a psychological profile.
¶61  The reasonableness requirement for the price of the data-free option, which we 
advocate, would impose a dual constraint. First, the price must remain within 1.5 times 
the average variable cost of the provision of service. Second, it may not exceed the 
marginal value of personalized data. While we currently lack data for average variable 
cost, the latter constraint imposes a limit of $6 for the monthly price of the data-free 
option of Facebook. It seems that such a reasonable price might motivate a significant 
five-factor model and its applications, 60 J. PERS. 175 (1992). The five personality traits are openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. 
191 See Staiano et al., supra note 189. 
192 See, e.g., Danielle K. Citron & Mary A. Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. (2014). Whereas in recent years the anti-revenge porn movement has achieved significant 
results in enacting statutes that criminalize this practice in the states, a federal bill is still missing. Our 
policy proposals therefore remain relevant.
193 Supra, Part II.B.1. 
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number of privacy-minded users to switch to a data-free option. At the very least, pricing 
is prevented from becoming prohibitive by the reasonableness control we propose. 
¶62  As long as the active choice regime has not been installed by legislation, courts 
may resort to the doctrine of unconscionability to strike down specific privacy provisions 
in EULAs or similar contracts. As was noted, the current take-it-or-leave-it nature of 
privacy policies creates a significant imbalance in bargaining power and deprives users of 
meaningful choice. At least under the California doctrine, the procedural prong of 
unconscionability is therefore fulfilled. However, provisions also need to be substantially 
unconscionable to be struck down under the unconscionability test. 
¶63  At a general level, it may be argued that one potential source of substantial 
unconscionability resides in the very framework of the data policies of social media 
providers such as Facebook: the fact that personal user data generates massive profits 
without sharing any of these profits with the users. Obviously, users gain nonmonetary 
advantages from using Facebook and other social media networks. However, if these user 
benefits are dwarfed by the company benefits, the doctrine concerning grossly inadequate 
pricing (substantive unconscionability) could be mobilized.194 The cases coming down 
under this prong of the test have traditionally compared a market price with the actual 
price charged. The problem with data-collecting services is that a monetized market price 
for comparable services does not exist, leaving the courts without a yardstick to 
determine whether the value of data disclosed is inadequate vis-à-vis the services offered. 
Nonetheless, the fact that all revenue from the data unilaterally goes to the social media 
provider could motivate a finding of unfair one-sidedness. As we have seen, however, the 
marginal revenue generated from personalized data of a single user likely amounts to 
approximately $1-10 per month in the case of Facebook. This does not seem to make the 
contract “so one-sided as to shock the conscience.”195
¶64  In any event, specific features of the data policies may qualify for substantial 
unconscionability. For example, Facebook states in its data policy that “we use the 
information we have to improve our advertising and measurement systems so we can 
show you relevant ads on and off our Services.” [italics added by the authors] “We work 
with third party companies […] who use advertising or related products […].” “We 
transfer information to vendors, service providers, and other partners who globally 
support our business […].”196 According to industry sources, the personalization of non-
Facebook websites by means of Facebook data is a growing source of revenue for 
Facebook that will likely be expanded in the future. Such selling of collected data to third 
parties may be deemed “unreasonably favorable” to Facebook.197 While it may still seem 
conscionable that Facebook uses user data to generate revenue via advertising on its own 
website, this evaluation changes when data are sold to third parties. First, users generally 
expect data to be used for advertising on Facebook; this may be less true for third-party 
194 See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522 (N.J. 1971); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S. 2d 
264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Fleet v. United States Consumer Council, Inc., 22 Ill. 95 B.R. 319 (E.D. Pa. 
1989); see also Kornhauser, supra note 147, at 1159–61.
195 Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 1999); Ferguson 
v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002). 
196 Facebook, Inc., Data Policy, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php [https://perma.cc/JC9Q-
BZJJ].
197 For this standard, see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 315 (1965). 
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websites.198 Second, this policy strikes down all barriers that would contain personal 
information within the (already vast) domain of Facebook. Rather, personal data are 
spread around the web, creating unforeseeable risks of data leaks and loss of control for 
users while unilaterally benefiting Facebook in the generation of revenue. This causes a 
profound imbalance of contractual duties so that a finding of substantial 
unconscionability would be well-motivated. 
¶65  Our third proposal extends to the democratization of data collection. We suggest 
that large companies like Google or Facebook should be required to conduct regular 
surveys among their current and potential users (who might be put off by their data 
policies but nevertheless are generally interested in using their services). The survey 
would generate representative data on the feelings and preferences of participants toward 
the data policies of the social media providers. The results would need to be disclosed 
publicly. As Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz have implied in a related context, requiring 
large companies to regularly conduct surveys does not amount to an excessive burdening 
of the providers.199 Furthermore, privacy protection would certainly benefit from an 
institutionalized data protection compliance officer democratically elected, in part, by 
users.
¶66  Finally, it is particularly relevant to change to a regime of revenue- and wealth-
responsive fines for the violation of data privacy rules when dealing with highly 
capitalized companies such as Facebook or Google. Any system of fixed-rate fines would 
most likely fail to produce any tangible deterrent effect, as evident in the controversial 
behavior of the company so far. The provision in the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation mandating fines up to 2% of global annual turnover is a step in the right 
direction.200 The widespread use of social networks and search engines makes our 
proposal impactful for consumers generally. As our hypothetical case study has shown, 
implementation of our policy proposals would give users the opportunity for making real 
choices about their data when they use such services. More importantly however, our first 
case study has shown the real-life impact that active choice, unconscionability, the 
democratization of data collection, and wealth-responsive penalties can have for groups 
that can easily suffer discrimination caused by Big Data. 
B. Student Education Software 
¶67  Over the past decade, the introduction of new software for individualized learning 
across schools in the U.S. has generated numerous opportunities for improving the 
education process while also triggering a number of legitimate concerns201 over the use of 
198 But see Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 545, 600 (2014) (showing that a majority of respondents in a randomized survey did expect 
Facebook to share data with third parties). 
199 Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 545, 584 (2014) (noting that “[t]he seller must establish through independent testing that a majority of 
consumers who read the box learn the true impact of the unexpected term.”). 
200 Art. 79(6) of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
201 Joel Reidenberg et al., Privacy and Cloud Computing in Public Schools, CTR. L. & INFO. POL’Y
1–2 (2013), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=clip,
[https://perma.cc/F24MGA6L]; Monica Bulger, Personalized Learning: The Conversations We’re Not 
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student data for marketing or other questionable purposes (e.g., for compiling student 
profiles that can later be sold to data brokers, future employers, etc.). Since current 
federal legislation offers only limited protection,202 bipartisan legislative drafts have been 
introduced to close some of the flagrant loopholes.203 In the meantime, attempts to 
regulate the field have also emerged in various states.204
¶68  Not all of our proposed strategies can be applied to this sector. A data-free option 
might imply more expenses for poor parents on the one hand, and jeopardize the efficient 
roll-out of personalized learning for all, on the other. However, implementing some of the 
suggestions we have made in this article to the area of student privacy would supplement 
the proposed legislation in various ways. First, as with the test case on social media, the 
substantial prong of the unconscionability doctrine can be invoked if student records are 
shared with third parties without parental control and solely for the enrichment of 
software providers. In order to avoid being held responsible under the procedural prong 
(take-it-or-leave-it offers) and still modernize the learning process, school boards might 
want to have parents participate and vote in the selection of student learning software 
providers. This would ensure that children’s interests are represented in a more robust 
manner and would arguably increase the bargaining power of the school in negotiating 
not only competitive prices but also non-discriminatory storage and use of educational 
records. A troubling issue with the existing federal legislation is that it does not give 
students or parents meaningful control over students’ personally identifiable information 
(PII) collected by the software providers. Further democratizing the process by requiring 
the software providers to conduct surveys would allow for systemic monitoring of the 
parents’ and students’ actual preferences. Ultimately, subjecting schools’ contracts with 
education software providers to ex post evaluation in the light of the unconscionability 
doctrine would ensure that there are no abuses. 
¶69  Finally, one of the prominent criticisms of the existing federal statute is that it does 
not impose strong penalties. Applying a wealth-responsive fine to companies that sell 
student data or use it for targeted advertising would deter them from such violations in 
Having, (Data & Soc. Res. Inst. Working Paper, July 22, 2016), http://datasociety.net/output/personalized-
learning-the-conversations-were-not-having/ [https://perma.cc/C8YL-AD5K]. 
202 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), Pub. L. No. 93-380 (1974), codified at 
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2013). FERPA covers only educational agencies or institutions that receive funds 
through particular programs administered by the United States Secretary of Education. Even if covered by 
FERPA, schools that have contracts with cloud computing service providers may be able to circumvent the 
statute’s provision for parental consent under the statutory exception for “school officials”, broadly 
interpreted under FERPA. See, e.g., Dalia Topelson Ritvo, Privacy and Student Data: An Overview of 
Federal Laws Impacting Student Information Collected Through Networked Technologies, BERKMAN CTR.
FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARV. U. (2016)
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/27410234/Student_Privacy_Guide_6_27_2016_FINAL.pdf?se
quence=1 [https://perma.cc/A6KG-QKHQ0].  
203 For a comparison of relevant provisions of the Californian Bill (SOPIPA) with the proposed in 
2015 Polis-Messer Federal Bill and a voluntary code of conduct, see Brenda Leong, De-Identification & 
Student Data, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (JULY 2015), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF-DeID-
FINAL-7242015jp.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFT2-S9KZ].  
204 For variations of student privacy regulations that either require K-12 schools to contractually 
oblige vendors to safeguard student privacy and security, prohibit secondary uses of student data without 
parental consent or introduce measures for the collection and use of pupil data, see National Conference of 
State Legislatures, Protecting Student Privacy in a Networked World, (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/student-data-privacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q4XQ-JK3L]. 
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the future without unnecessarily burdening the start-ups that are experimenting with the 
development of new learning personalization software solutions. Similarly, a wealth-
responsive fine can constitute a proportionate response to the concerns of some education 
software providers that are unhappy with the lack of a level playing field, given that 
under some of the tabled proposals fines might apply to private companies but not to the 
non-profit sector or the school districts.205
C. Credit Card and Cell Phone Markets 
 Another example concerns more traditional markets on which customer data are 
collected on a large scale, often to the detriment of customers: credit card and cell phone 
markets. As Oren Bar-Gill and others have shown in a range of impressive studies, 
providers use the data collected to design contracts that exploit the weaknesses of 
consumers.206 These are clear cases of what Ryan Calo has called “digital market 
manipulation”;207 in the economics literature, these are also referred to as “exploitative 
contracts.”208 A particularly telling example is the study by Shui and Ausubel based on a 
dataset they obtained from a large commercial U.S. bank.209 The bank sent offers 
containing different credit card contracts to 600,000 US customers. The most popular 
offer unsurprisingly turned out to contain a teaser rate with a low introductory and a high 
back-end interest rate.210 The bank monitored the spending behavior of those recently-
acquired credit card customers over a longer time. The data revealed that 79% of 
customers who had chosen the teaser rate had opted for the wrong contract— assuming 
equal spending behavior, a non-teaser contract would have served them better.211 If—as 
can be assumed— the bank uses these data to specifically offer the teaser rates to these 
consumers, this is a classic example of adverse targeting.212 As Duncan McDonald, 
former general counsel of Citigroup's Europe and North America credit card section, puts 
it:
No other industry in the world knows consumers and their transaction 
behavior better than the bank card industry. It has turned the analysis of 
consumers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA. The mathematics of 
virtually everything consumers do is stored, updated, categorized, 
churned, scored, tested, valued, and compared from every possible angle 
in hundreds of the most powerful computers and by among the most 
205 See Petkova, supra note 102.
206 BAR-GILL, supra note 18, chs. 3 & 4, particularly at 217–23; Michael D. Grubb, Selling to 
Overconfident Consumers, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1770 (2009). 
207 Calo, supra note 7. 
208 Paul Heidhues & Botond K
szegi, Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit Market,
100 AM. ECON. REV. 2279 (2010); Botond K
szegi, Behavioral Contract Theory, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1075, 1104–10 (2014); Paul Heidhues, Botond K
szegi & Takeshi Murooka, Exploitative Innovation, 8
AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 1 (2016). 
209 Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market, (2004) 
(unpublished dissertation, Graduate School of the University of Maryland), 
http://web.natur.cuni.cz/~houdek3/papers/economics_psychology/Shui%20Ausubel%202006.pdf.
210 Shui & Ausubel, supra note 209, at 8–9. 
211 Shui & Ausubel, supra note 209, at 9. 
212 See Kamenica, Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 8. 
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creative minds anywhere. In the past 10 years alone, the transactions of 
200 million Americans have been reviewed in trillions of different ways to 
minimize bank card risks.213
¶70  Notably for our context, credit markets offer potential not only for exploitation, but 
also for discrimination. Studies suggest that racial discrimination is still prevalent in the 
credit sector, with African-American and Hispanic citizens’ access to credit being 
significantly restricted.214 Protected groups, moreover, generally continue to face 
discrimination in consumer markets, being offered worse terms, higher prices, and less 
service.215
¶71  How would the regulation we propose change the picture? First, the mandated 
active choice regime would raise awareness of the prevalence of data collection in the 
credit card business. Furthermore, it would enable a real choice between an offer with 
higher interest rates but no data collection and one with the inverse features. Particularly 
vulnerable groups may use this option to prevent explicit or implicit instances of 
discrimination by algorithms. Second, unconscionability could be mobilized to invalidate 
provisions in credit card contracts allowing the selling of data to third parties. A major 
issue in this context would be whether a finding of unconscionability would also extend 
to the transmission of data to credit-scoring companies. At least theoretically, it may be 
claimed that credit-scoring companies provide useful services in the marketplace and that 
they enable risk allocation. However, given the opaque nature of scoring combined with 
its potentially far-reaching consequences for the scored subjects,216 it may be reasonably 
argued that scoring agencies present a significant and hard-to-determine risk for the 
affected party. This may motivate a finding of such a provision to be unreasonably one-
sided. Third, the democratization measures would require large companies to conduct 
surveys on the willingness of subjects to be scored. Furthermore, companies would need 
to obtain explicit consent in order to change their privacy provisions to allow more data 
collection, sharing, and processing. The greatest contribution, however, may come from 
the institutionalization of a data privacy compliance officer. She could monitor the 
methods and purposes of data collection and blow the whistle if the data is used in 
exploitative contracts to the detriment of customers. The compliance officer would 
therefore regularly report to a supervisory authority such as the FTC or the CFPB 
whenever practices such as those uncovered by Shui and Ausubel217 or Bar-Gill218 are 
prevalent in the company. 
¶72  Finally, fines which sanction violations of privacy regulation and administrative or 
criminal proceedings would have to be adapted to the revenue and value of the to achieve 
effective deterrence. In the case of exploitative contracts, they could be coupled with the 
disgorgement of profits either to the exploited parties or to the supervisory authority. 
213 Duncan A. McDonald, Viewpoint: Card Industry Questions Congress Needs to Ask, AM.
BANKER (March 23, 2007), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/172_58/-306775-1.html; see also 
Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know about You?, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K2PY-DHQY].
214 Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 189–91. 
215 Pager & Shepherd, supra note 38, at 191–92. 
216 PASQUALE, supra note 2, chs. 2 & 4; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2, at 8–16. 
217 See supra note 209. 
218 BAR-GILL, supra note 18, chs. 3 & 4, particularly at 217–23. 
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CONCLUSION
¶73  This article spells out the hitherto unrecognized ambivalence of Big Data regarding 
its tremendous potential not only to entrench existing inequalities but also to promote an 
equality agenda in new and powerful ways. Recent scholarship has stressed Big Data’s 
potential to exacerbate both intentional and unintentional discrimination. We pick up on 
this problematic aspect, and expand and complicate it by unfolding the potential of Big 
Data to reduce both legal and economic inequality. Big Data’s ambivalence hinges on its 
unique ability to differentiate between different situations and persons, for good or for ill. 
The key challenge for the law is to facilitate useful distinctions between differently 
situated agents while curbing illegitimate discrimination.
¶74  We review a range of regulatory tools, which are novel in this context and can help 
in achieving the ambitious task of reining in Big Data’s potential. As a corollary, some of 
these approaches promote transparency, a desideratum highlighted in much of the 
previous scholarship. The new regulatory models we suggest contribute to a prevention 
of the exploitation of users by asymmetrically better-situated market players, but are 
especially relevant for groups vulnerable to discrimination. The use of algorithmic 
decision-making creates unfortunate economic incentives for new forms of 
discrimination that do not easily square with the current anti-discrimination doctrine. We 
have proposed four regulatory instruments. First, active choice may be mandated between 
data-collecting and data-free services, coupled with a novel form of price control derived 
from antitrust law. The latter feature ensures that a data-free option is not merely 
hypothetical but is an economically realistic option. Second, as long as such strategies are 
not enacted by law, we propose using the doctrine of unconscionability to institutionalize 
the ex post review of contract clauses which unreasonably favor the data-collecting or 
processing company. Third, data collection and processing should be democratized. This 
can be achieved primarily through mandatory surveys of current and potential users on 
the one hand, and through the institutionalization of a high-level data protection 
compliance officer, to be elected by current users, on the other. Finally, we note that 
income- (or revenue-) and wealth-responsive fines, both for individual persons and for 
companies, provide a unique tool to couple effective and just deterrence with the 
reduction of both economic and legal inequality. 
¶75  This array of tools must be adapted to different contexts and situations. We 
reviewed three cases in which they may bring new solutions to old problems. In the 
context of social media, all four instruments can counter the increasing loss of control of 
users over their own data. Education software can make use of some of the outlined 
solutions. In the realm of credit card and cell phone contracts, where adverse targeting 
and exploitative contracts have been both empirically and theoretically found to be 
rampant, our approach may substantially curb the power of providers to unilaterally use 
data to the detriment of their clients. 
¶76  Many more examples could and should be discussed. In the face of increasing 
unease about the asymmetry of power between Big Data collectors and dispersed users, 
about differential legal treatment, and about the unprecedented dimensions of economic 
inequality, this article proposes a new regulatory framework and research agenda to put 
the powerful engine of Big Data to the benefit of the individual. 
